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J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile  
Confession Suppression Law 
Martin Guggenheim   
Randy Hertz  
The Supreme Court‘s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina1 in 
2011 marks a watershed moment in the jurisprudence of juvenile 
rights. Addressing a question left open in Miranda v. Arizona
2
 more 
than four decades ago, the Court made clear in J.D.B. that a judicial 
determination of whether a minor suspect is ―in custody‖ for Miranda 
purposes must take into account the age of the suspect because 
juveniles cannot be held to the same standard as adults.
3
 When one 
considers the broader context of the Court‘s criminal law 
jurisprudence of recent years, it is apparent that J.D.B. reflects the 
Court‘s willingness to extend, into new areas of criminal law, a 
recent line of cases that treats age eighteen as a central dividing line 
in how the Eighth Amendment regulates the sentences of capital 
punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
4
 
When one looks even further back into Supreme Court history, it is 
evident that J.D.B. marks a return to special protections for youth that 
characterized the Court‘s confession suppression caselaw more than 
half a century ago.
5
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gratefully acknowledge support from the Filomen D‘Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Fund at 
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 Vice Dean and Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law.  
 1. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 3. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402–08. 
 4. See infra notes 168–85 and accompanying text (discussing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2011 (2010) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). 
 5. See infra Part I. 
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We believe that J.D.B. could be a game changer in delinquency 
and criminal cases involving minor suspects, if the Supreme Court 
and the lower courts adhere and give appropriate weight to the legal 
principles and legislative facts that the Court ratified in J.D.B. If 
applied and extended in a logical and reasonable manner, the J.D.B. 
decision should transform police interrogations of juvenile suspects. 
At the very least, J.D.B. should require that all aspects of Miranda 
and other constitutional rules governing interrogations be 
reconceptualized in order to reflect fundamental differences between 
minors and adults. If the courts truly take to heart the lessons of 
J.D.B., we believe that the result will be a rule that requires that 
juvenile suspects be afforded an attorney prior to and during a police 
interrogation. 
This Article begins by looking back at juvenile confession 
suppression law in the half century preceding J.D.B. and examines 
the evolution of the doctrines applied in J.D.B. Part I demonstrates 
the special solicitude that the Court accorded juveniles half a century 
ago under the due process standard of voluntariness of statements and 
examines how and why this special protection was diluted in the 
ensuing decades. 
Part II focuses on J.D.B. itself. This section examines the new 
direction the Court took, the various ways in which J.D.B. diverged 
from the confession suppression jurisprudence of preceding years, 
and how the decision built upon the reasoning of recent Eighth 
Amendment caselaw. We also take a close look at the legislative facts 
in the J.D.B. decision and consider the implications of the Court 
having taken judicial notice of these legislative facts. 
Part III presents our views of the changes that J.D.B. demands of 
the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Part III.A shows that 
J.D.B.‘s restructuring of the standard for one aspect of Miranda 
analysis requires commensurate changes in all other aspects of the 
Miranda doctrine and other constitutional rules governing police 
interrogations. Part III.B presents our view that J.D.B., properly 
extended, requires that counsel be afforded to any minor suspect prior 
to and during any police interrogation. 
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I. THE ROAD TO J.D.B.: THE (MIS)EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR JUVENILES IN POLICE INTERROGATIONS IN 
CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 
In J.D.B., Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the majority, 
demonstrated the lineage and self-evident nature of the majority‘s 
reasoning. Justice Sotomayor quoted from Supreme Court decisions 
in 1948 and 1962, respectively, Haley v. Ohio
6
 and Gallegos v. 
Colorado,
7
 that recognized the need for special protections for youth 
in the context of police interrogations.
8
 Justice Sotomayor quoted the 
plurality‘s statement in Haley that police interrogation conditions that 
―‗would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and 
overwhelm a lad in his early teens.‘‖9 She quoted the Court‘s 
statement in Gallegos that ―‗[n]o matter how sophisticated,‘ a 
juvenile subject of police interrogation ‗cannot be compared‘ to an 
adult subject.‖10 ―[T]hese observations,‖ she said, ―restate what ‗any 
parent knows‘—indeed, what any person knows—about children 
generally.‖11 Addressing ―social science and cognitive science 
authorities,‖12 which had been cited by petitioner J.D.B. and amici for 
the petitioner in their briefs,
13
 she noted that this ―literature confirms 
what [such] experience bears out,‖ and thus ―citation to social science 
and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these 
commonsense propositions.‖14 
In this way, Justice Sotomayor presented a compelling story of a 
longstanding, well-accepted view of the Court: Constitutional 
 
 6. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
 7. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 8. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 
U.S. 49 (1962) and Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596 (1948)). 
 9. Id. (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion)). 
 10. Id. (quoting Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. at 54). 
 11. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 12. Id. at 2403 n.5. 
 13. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 
09-11121), 2010 WL 5168873, at *20; Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13–17, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 
(2011) (No. 09-11121), 2010 WL 2813537, at *13–*17; Brief of the American Bar Association 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10–17, 19–20, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 
2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121), 2010 WL 5385326, at *10–*17. 
 14. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5. 
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regulation of police interrogations of juveniles in criminal and 
delinquency cases must take into account certain irrefutable qualities 
of young people that are obvious to ―‗any parent.‘‖ But the story is 
more complicated, as becomes immediately evident when one 
considers that the two Supreme Court decisions cited by Justice 
Sotomayor were decided so long ago. These are the last of the 
Court‘s decisions prior to J.D.B. to recognize and enforce the 
principle in the context of police interrogation of juveniles. As Part I 
shows, the promise of Haley and Gallegos was not realized, and was 
actually diluted in important respects, in the half-century between 
Gallegos and J.D.B. 
To understand the detours and dead-ends that took place during 
this past half-century, it is useful to divide this period into three 
segments: (A) the pre-Miranda era, when the central constitutional 
constraint on police interrogations of juveniles was the due process 
doctrine of involuntariness; (B) the period that began with the 
issuance of Miranda in 1966 and culminated with the Supreme 
Court‘s issuance of a decision in 197915 clarifying the operation of 
the Miranda rule in juvenile cases; and (C) the period from 1979 until 
the Court‘s issuance of its two rulings on the subject of Miranda 
―custody‖ in juvenile cases—Yarborough v. Alvarado16 in 2004 and 
J.D.B. in 2011. 
A. The Pre-Miranda Era of Due Process Regulation of Police 
Interrogations of Juveniles 
1. Haley and Gallegos: The Supreme Court‘s Laying of a 
Foundation for Robust Constitutional Protections of Youth in 
Police Interrogations 
The 1948 decision in Haley v. Ohio
17
 is best understood as part of 
a series of cases in which the Court reacted to abusive practices in 
police interrogations by establishing protections for suspects under 
the Due Process Clause. This was an era before state criminal cases 
 
 15. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 16. 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
 17. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
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were subject to the protections of the Bill of Rights—which would 
occur as a result of Supreme Court rulings of the 1960s that 
―incorporated‖ those rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and, by 
means of that mechanism, applied them to the States;
18
 thus, the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause was the primary 
vehicle for affording constitutional protections against abuses by state 
police officers. The Court provided these protections in a series of 
cases in the mid-twentieth century by creating a vibrant jurisprudence 
on due process regulation of the voluntariness of a statement obtained 
from a suspect in interrogation by state police officers. 
The earliest cases in this series typically dealt with the most 
extreme forms of police coercion: physical force; threats of force; 
denial of food and rest; and being held incommunicado by the 
police.
19
 In later cases, the Court extended the protections of the Due 
Process Clause to suppress confessions extracted by subtler forms of 
coercion. For example, in Leyra v. Denno (1954),
20
 the Court held a 
confession involuntary under the Due Process Clause because it was 
extracted by a psychiatrist brought in by the police (in ostensible 
response to the suspect‘s request for a physician to provide aid for a 
painful sinus attack) who used ―subtle and suggestive questions‖ to 
―induce‖ the suspect to confess.21 In Spano v. New York (1959),22 the 
Court suppressed a confession obtained by a police officer who was a 
childhood friend of the suspect‘s and who told the suspect that the 
officer‘s failure to secure a confession would cause problems for him 
 
 18. A detailed history of the ―incorporation‖ jurisprudence can be found in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3031–36 (2010). The Court held in McDonald that the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated in the Due Process Clause. See 
id. at 3050. 
 19. Thus, for example, the Court suppressed statements that were extracted by means of a 
brutal beating (Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281–85 (1936)); keeping the suspect 
incommunicado for a week after arrest while the police moved him from one jail to another, 
interrogating him around the clock with relay teams of four to ten officers (Chambers v. 
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 229–35 (1940)); subjecting a suspect to thirty-six hours of continuous 
cross-examinations by prosecutors, working in relay teams as the suspect was denied sleep or 
rest of any sort (Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 148–54 (1944)); and stripping the 
suspect, keeping him in solitary confinement, and threatening physical violence (Malinski v. 
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403–07 (1945)). 
 20. 347 U.S. 556, 559–61 (1954). 
 21. Id. at 559. 
 22. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:109 
 
 
with his superiors. In Lynumn v. Illinois (1963),
23
 the Court found a 
statement to be involuntary largely because the police told the 
defendant that ―state financial aid for her infant children would be cut 
off, and her children taken from her, if she did not ‗cooperate.‘‖24 
The later cases also deepened the quality of analysis by 
accounting for a variety of characteristics that can render a suspect 
particularly susceptible to police pressure and thus especially likely 
to make an involuntary statement. In addition to the Court‘s 
recognition in Haley v. Ohio (1948) that the young age of a suspect is 
such a quality, the Court held that the voluntariness of a statement 
can be vitiated by a suspect‘s mental retardation,25 mental illness,26 
the effects of drugs,
27
 a limited education,
28
 and/or lack of prior 
experience with the criminal justice system.
29
 
In deciding whether to deem a confession involuntary under the 
Due Process Clause (and, as part of that determination, how much to 
weigh particular factors), the Court employed an amorphous standard 
that failed to provide the courts or the police with much guidance. 
The Court repeatedly stated that the question of whether the 
accused‘s ―will was overborne at the time he confessed‖30 was to be 
determined ―on the ‗totality of the circumstances.‘‖31 In what appears 
to have been an effort to rationalize and guide applications of the 
involuntariness doctrine, Justice Felix Frankfurter issued a lengthy, 
 
 23. 372 U.S. 528 (1963). 
 24. Id. at 534. 
 25. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (I.Q. of sixty-four); Reck v. Pate, 
367 U.S. 433 (1961) (mental retardation); see also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) 
(limited mental capacity); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (low level of 
intelligence). 
 26. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193, 196 (1957) (schizophrenia); see also Spano 
v. New York, 360 U.S. at 322 & n.3 (emotional instability). 
 27. See Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (morphine); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293 (1963) (scopolamine, a drug with ―truth serum‖ properties). 
 28. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (third grade education and illiteracy); 
Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (fifth grade education); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 
U.S. at 609, 620 (illiteracy); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. at 196 (defendant was ―uneducated‖). 
 29. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. at 442; Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. at 712; Spano v. New 
York, 360 U.S. at 321. 
 30. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. at 440. 
 31. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 480 (1969) (quoting Fikes, 352 U.S. at 197); see 
also, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962). 
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encyclopedic opinion in the 1961 case, Culombe v. Connecticut.
32
 
The opinion analyzed caselaw of preceding decades to extrapolate 
relevant considerations and laid out a test for assessing whether a 
confession in a particular case should be deemed involuntary.
33
 
Although five other Justices joined Frankfurter in reversing 
Culombe‘s conviction (based on the defendant‘s low I.Q., illiteracy, 
incommunicado detention, and prolonged interrogation), only one 
Justice (Potter Stewart) joined Frankfurter‘s opinion.34 In a 
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that he 
―would prefer not to write on many of the difficult questions which 
the opinion [of Justice Frankfurter] discusses until the facts of a 
particular case make such writing necessary,‖ and that he would 
rather continue ―develop[ing] the law on a case-by-case approach.‖35 
The very next year, the Court decided Gallegos, which suppressed as 
involuntary the confession of a fourteen-year-old who was held 
incommunicado. Implicitly referencing the Court‘s rejection of 
Justice Frankfurter‘s effort the previous year, Justice William O. 
Douglas observed in his majority opinion in Gallegos that ―[t]here is 
no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except the totality of 
circumstances.‖36 
Haley presented the type of brutal scenario typical of the early 
involuntariness cases. John Haley, a fifteen-year-old African 
American youth,
37
 was arrested on capital murder charges for 
 
 32. 367 U.S. 568 (1961). 
 33. See id. at 571–635 (Frankfurter, J., majority opinion). 
 34. See id. at 568. 
 35. Id. at 636 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justice Douglas issued a concurring opinion, 
joined by Justice Black, that began by announcing that he ―find[s] this case a simple one‖ for 
reversal of the conviction, and then explained why in fairly short order. Id. at 637–41 (Douglas, 
J., concurring). Justice Brennan issued a paragraph-long opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Black, explaining his view that ―under our cases none [of the confessions] is 
admissible in evidence against [Culombe].‖ Id. at 641–42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). 
 36. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. at 55. 
 37. In his plurality opinion in Haley, Justice Douglas made specific reference to John 
Haley‘s race. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597 (1948). The early involuntariness decisions 
of the Supreme Court often involved the most egregious forms of racial violence by white 
officers against African American suspects. For example, in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936), a deputy sheriff, together with a mob of ―white men,‖ hanged a suspect from a tree 
twice and, after cutting him down, tied him to a tree and whipped him; two other suspects were 
taken to the police station, where the deputy sheriff, again ―accompanied by a number of white 
men,‖ stripped the suspects and whipped them with leather straps with buckles. Id. at 281–82. 
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allegedly serving as a lookout as two slightly older youths robbed a 
store and killed the shop owner.
38
 Haley testified that he was beaten 
by the police, and his mother gave confirmatory testimony that 
―when she first saw him five days after his arrest he was bruised and 
skinned,‖ and that ―the clothes he wore when arrested, which were 
exchanged two days later for clean ones she brought to the jail, were 
torn and blood-stained.‖39 Justice Douglas, who authored a plurality 
opinion for the reversal of the conviction that was joined with respect 
to the judgment by Justice Frankfurter, excluded this testimony from 
the analysis because, as Justice Douglas explained, ―[t]he police 
testified to the contrary on this entire line of testimony,‖ and it was 
possible to resolve the case based on ―only the undisputed 
testimony.‖40 The undisputed testimony established that a fifteen-
 
In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), which involved a robbery-murder of an ―elderly 
white man,‖ the police arrested ―twenty-five to forty‖ African Americans without warrants, 
confined them in jail, and subjected them to constant interrogations for a week in a jail room, 
surrounded by ―four to ten men, the county sheriff, his deputies, a convict guard, and other 
white officers and citizens of the community.‖ Id. at 229–32.  
 38. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 597. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 597–98. Perhaps for this same reason, Justice Douglas also did not advert to the 
racial dimensions of the case beyond identifying the race of the accused and observing that 
―[a]ge 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race.‖ See id. at 597, 599; see also supra 
note 37 and accompanying text. The dissenting Justices declared that ―[t]here is no suggestion 
that racial discrimination or prejudice existed in the attitude of any of the witnesses, or of the 
courts or of the community of Canton.‖ Haley, 332 U.S. at 615 (Burton, J., dissenting). Given 
that neither the plurality nor the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter even suggested that 
race had played a factor, the fact that the dissenters felt the need to proclaim the absence of 
racial bias implicitly supports an obvious inference: that, in a capital murder case in 1948, in 
which the accused was an African American youth, racial bias surely played a role in numerous 
aspects of the case; at the very least, an African American youth, held incommunicado by the 
police, would have had good reason to fear grave injury at the hands of the police. 
 The dissenting Justices‘ failure to appreciate (or perhaps simply to acknowledge) the racial 
overtones helps to explain their inability to perceive a central flaw in a dichotomy they 
presented. After stating that the Supreme Court, ―[a]s a reviewing court,‖ has ―a major 
obligation to guard against reading into the printed record purely conjectural concepts,‖ the 
dissenters stated: ―To conjecture from the printed record of this case that the accused, because 
of his known proximity to the scene of the crime and his known association that night with the 
boys, one of whom did the actual shooting, must have been a hardened, smart boy, whose 
conduct and falsehoods necessarily made all of his testimony worthless per se, is as 
unjustifiable as it would be to assume, without seeing him or his mother as witnesses, that he 
was an impressionable, innocent lad, likely to be panicstricken by police surroundings and that 
all his testimony must be accepted as true except where expressly admitted by him to have been 
false.‖ Id. at 618–19. It would appear that this passage is essentially a use of the rhetorical 
device of paraleipsis to portray John Haley as ―a hardened, smart‖ youth while ostensibly 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/5
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year-old youth had been arrested in his home, taken to a police 
station at midnight, and interrogated by relays of police officers for 
five hours until he confessed at 5:00 a.m.
41
 The plurality concluded 
that these facts were sufficient to find the statement to be coerced in 
violation of the Due Process Clause. Emphasizing the young age of 
the accused, the plurality stated in a passage that has come to 
epitomize the central principle of Haley: 
 What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if 
a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere 
child—an easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in 
scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and 
difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the 
more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a 
man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad 
in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which 
the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old lad, 
questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a 
ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly might 
stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe 
that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a 
contest.
42
 
What has received little attention, but will play a substantial role in 
our efforts later to pull together the lessons of Haley and other cases, 
is that a significant part of the plurality‘s analysis of the 
involuntariness of John Haley‘s confession was that he was denied 
the opportunity to confer with a lawyer. Immediately after the above-
quoted passage, the plurality stated:  
 
disclaiming that any such assertion is being made. In any event, a feeling of ―panic‖ would not 
have been limited to ―an impressionable, innocent lad.‖ Any African American youth of that 
era, arrested for a capital crime and held incommunicado at the police station, would have had 
reason to feel ―panic-stricken‖ about what the police might do to him. 
 41. See id. at 597–98 (Douglas, J., plurality opinion). 
 42. Id. at 599–600. This passage was later quoted, in full or part, in, e.g., J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1967); Gallegos v. 
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53 (1962); Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1067 (1981) (per curiam). 
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He [the youth in police custody] needs counsel and support if 
he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He 
needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering 
presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him. No 
friend stood at the side of this 15-year old boy as the police, 
working in relays, questioned him hour after hour, from 
midnight until dawn. No lawyer stood guard to make sure that 
the police went so far and no farther, to see to it that they 
stopped short of the point where he became the victim of 
coercion. No counsel or friend was called during the critical 
hours of questioning. A photographer was admitted once this 
lad broke and confessed. But not even a gesture towards 
getting a lawyer for him was ever made.
43
 
In summing up the factors that called for deeming the statement 
unconstitutionally involuntary, the plurality listed: ―The age of 
petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his 
quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, 
[and] the callous attitude of the police towards his rights.‖44 Then, in 
response to the argument that Haley had been ―advised of his 
constitutional rights before he signed the confession and that, 
knowing them, he nevertheless confessed,‖45 the plurality explained, 
―[t]hat assumes, however, that a boy of fifteen, without aid of 
counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the 
facts of this record he had a freedom of choice. We cannot indulge 
those assumptions.‖46 Justice Frankfurter, in a separate opinion, 
emphasized the young age of the accused, the incommunicado 
detention, and the ―protracted questioning carried on in secrecy, with 
the inevitable disquietude and fears police interrogations naturally 
engender in individuals questioned while held incommunicado,‖ and 
also listed the denial of ―aid of counsel‖ as among the factors that 
rendered the confession involuntary.
47
 In describing the Haley 
holding in a later opinion, Justice Frankfurter stressed that Haley 
 
 43. Haley, 332 U.S. at 600. 
 44. Id. at 600–01. 
 45. Id. at 601. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 605, 607 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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―had seen no friend or legal counsel‖ during the time he was held 
incommunicado by the police.
48
 
The Court‘s 1962 decision in Gallegos v. Colorado,49 the other 
case (along with Haley) cited by the majority in J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina to document the lineage of the Supreme Court‘s particularly 
protective treatment of juveniles in confession suppression cases, 
reiterated and reinforced Haley‘s recognition that the analysis of a 
statement‘s involuntariness should take into account a suspect‘s 
young age as well as the denial of counsel. Writing for a majority of 
the Court this time, Justice Douglas held in Gallegos that a statement 
taken from a fourteen-year-old after five days of incommunicado 
detention must be deemed involuntary. ―The fact that petitioner was 
only 14 years old,‖ wrote Justice Douglas, ―puts this case on the same 
footing as Haley v. Ohio.‖50 The five-day period of incommunicado 
detention, Justice Douglas wrote, was a period during which Robert 
Gallegos ―saw no lawyer, parent or other friendly adult.‖51 
Explaining the importance of access to counsel when a suspect is a 
minor, Justice Douglas stated: 
[T]he five-day detention—during which time the boy‘s mother 
unsuccessfully tried to see him and he was cut off from contact 
with any lawyer or adult advisor—gives the case an ominous 
cast. The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his right 
to counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his 
parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is 
unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him 
when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, 
we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in 
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the 
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to 
know how to protest his own interests or how to get the 
benefits of his constitutional rights. 
 
 48. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 624 (1961). 
 49. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 50. Id. at 53.  
 51. Id. at 50. 
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. . . He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of 
his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his 
admissions. He would have no way of knowing what the 
consequences of his confession were without advice as to his 
rights—from someone concerned with securing him those 
rights—and without the aid of more mature judgment as to the 
steps he should take in the predicament in which he found 
himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have 
given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity 
could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal 
footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protection 
against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to 
know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.
52
 
Employing the ―totality of the circumstances‖ standard, the Court 
held that the statement must be found involuntary because of the 
following factors: ―[t]he youth of the petitioner, the long detention, 
the failure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring 
him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, [and] the failure to see to 
it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend.‖53 
Four years after Gallegos, the Court announced its decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona,
54
 which drastically changed the landscape of 
confession suppression jurisprudence and shifted much of the courts‘, 
litigants‘, and commentators‘ attention from the due process issue of 
involuntariness to issues concerning the application and waiver of 
Miranda rights. The effect of this transformation is the focus of Part 
I.B. But before taking up that part of the story, it is useful to 
understand how the lower courts applied Haley and Gallegos to 
juvenile confession suppression cases during the pre-Miranda era. 
 
 52. Id. at 54. 
 53. Id. at 55. 
 54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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2. The Lower Courts‘ Applications of the Due Process Doctrine 
of Involuntariness in Juvenile Confession Cases in the Pre-
Miranda Era 
A review of criminal and delinquency caselaw in the pre-Miranda 
era yields relatively few published lower court decisions addressing a 
claim that a juvenile‘s confession was involuntary in violation of the 
Due Process Clause.
55
 The relative paucity of such claims may be, at 
least in part, a function of the nature of the juvenile court system in 
that era. Until the Supreme Court issued the 1967 seminal decision of 
In re Gault
56
 (one year after Miranda), it was widely believed by 
judges and lawyers that juvenile delinquency proceedings should be 
informal, with ―[t]he rules of criminal procedure . . . altogether 
inapplicable‖ and the juvenile deprived of ―the procedural rights 
available to his elders.‖57 Until Gault made clear that juveniles have a 
constitutional right to counsel,
58
 many States denied counsel in 
delinquency proceedings; thus there would have been no defenders to 
file confession suppression motions in many cases. Moreover, even 
 
 55. To find such cases, we conducted a Westlaw search in the ALLSTATES and 
ALLFEDS databases for all cases before 6-13-1966 (the date of the Miranda decision) that 
contained the search terms ―confession & involuntar! & (juvenile [or] minor [or] child) & 
(Haley [or] Gallegos).‖ We reasoned that any decision concerning the application of the 
involuntariness doctrine to a juvenile‘s confession would likely contain a citation to either 
Haley or Gallegos or both in the majority opinion or at least in a concurrence or dissenting 
opinion. This search produced sixteen juvenile confession suppression cases in the 
ALLSTATES database and two juvenile confession suppression cases in the ALLFEDS 
database that were decided by federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court. (Three of the 
decisions we found relate to the same case: a New Jersey first-degree murder case in which the 
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the involuntariness claims of the two defendants (State v. 
Smith, 161 A.2d 520 (N.J. 1960)), and thereafter a federal district court denied federal habeas 
corpus relief (United States ex rel. Smith v. New Jersey, 194 F. Supp. 691 (D.N.J. 1961)), and 
the district court‘s ruling was subsequently affirmed by the en banc Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals (United States ex rel. Smith v. New Jersey, 323 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 1000 (1964)). This case is discussed infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. We 
recognize that there were surely some juvenile confession suppression decisions in this era that 
would not have cited either Haley or Gallegos, but we are inclined to think that our search 
parameters probably generated most of the relevant cases. 
 56. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 57. Id. at 15, 17. 
 58. At the time of the Gault decision, only one-third of the States had adopted legislation 
requiring provision of counsel in delinquency proceedings. See id. at 37–38. For Gault‘s 
discussion of the right to counsel, and its holding that juveniles have a due process right to 
counsel in delinquency proceedings, see id. at 35–42. 
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in those States that did provide counsel, there was confusion in the 
pre-Gault era about whether a lawyer for a juvenile in a delinquency 
case should function like a defender in an adult criminal case. Many 
commentators took the position that defenders should refrain from an 
adversarial stance on behalf of their juvenile clients and should 
instead work with the Family Court to obtain rehabilitative services 
for the client.
59
 As an early treatise on juvenile court work observed, 
―this cooperative, nonadvocate model often mandates encouraging an 
admission by the juvenile and avoiding the presentation of an 
available defense in order not to obstruct the rehabilitative goals of 
the juvenile court.‖60 Lawyers who were doing all they could to 
induce a client to confess were unlikely to file and aggressively 
litigate a motion to suppress a confession that the client had made to 
the police. Nonetheless, as is evident in the small body of reported 
cases on juvenile confession suppression in the pre-Miranda/post-
Gault era, there were at least some court-appointed and retained 
lawyers for minors in delinquency cases who filed confession 
suppression motions. Moreover, as in Haley v. Ohio and Gallegos v. 
Colorado, there were challenges to minors‘ confessions in cases in 
which a minor was prosecuted in adult court.
61
 
An examination of the published lower court opinions of this era 
illuminates an important point about the involuntariness doctrine, at 
least as it was applied by the lower courts at that time. As is readily 
apparent when one considers the wide-open nature of the Court‘s 
―totality of the circumstances‖ standard, the lower courts had a free 
 
 59. See, e.g., Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New 
Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 507 (1963); Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the 
Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401, 1410 
(1973). 
 60. PAUL PIERSMA, JEANETTE GANOUSIS, ADRIENNE E. VOLENIK, HARRY F. SWANGER & 
PATRICIA CONNELL, LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 47 (3d ed. 1977). 
 61. A minor may be prosecuted in adult court for a crime because the youth exceeds the 
maximum jurisdictional age for prosecution in Family Court (in those jurisdictions that set the 
cut-off below age eighteen) or because the youth is waived or transferred to adult court or, in 
some States, is automatically subject to adult court prosecution for an enumerated crime unless 
transferred down to Family Court. See generally RANDY HERTZ, MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & 
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT 
237–59 (2d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2009); see also THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring 
eds., 2000). 
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hand to denominate a confession as voluntary or involuntary. In cases 
involving the most serious types of crimes, the courts were likely to 
employ their discretion to reject involuntariness claims, using some 
fact or factor to distinguish the case from Haley and Gallegos. For 
example, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding stemming from a 
New Jersey first-degree murder conviction, the en banc Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected involuntariness claims by habeas corpus 
petitioners who were seventeen years old at the time of the crime and 
who were held incommunicado for at least nine-and-a-half hours and 
interrogated over the course of that period.
62
 To distinguish Haley 
and Gallegos, the majority stated that these ―defendants though 
young in years were seasoned in crime . . . [and] cannot be cloaked 
with the tender immaturity protection of Haley and Gallegos,‖ that 
―[t]hey were never expressly or impliedly threatened with continued 
incommunicado detentions,‖ and that ―[t]here is no evidence that the 
necessary interrogation was at all exhausting‖ (in that one defendant 
confessed after five hours of interrogation while the other confessed 
after one to three hours of interrogation).
63
 In a passage that reveals 
much about the court‘s motivations, the majority concluded by 
stating that ―reversal of these convictions would be a signal to the 
vicious elements rampant in our cities that the chances are excellent 
for eventually slipping out from under responsibility lawfully 
established for crimes which stagger belief.‖64 State court rejections 
of juvenile involuntariness claims during this era reflect a similar 
pattern of an extremely serious crime, circumstances that appear 
equivalent to those in Haley and Gallegos, and judicial straining to 
find some fact or factor that can be used to distinguish the case from 
those U.S. Supreme Court cases.
65
 
 
 62. United States ex rel. Smith v. New Jersey, 323 F.2d 146, 148–51 (3d Cir. 1963) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964).  
 63. Id. at 150. 
 64. Id. at 151. 
 65. See, e.g., Bean v. State, 199 A.2d 773, 776–78 (Md. Ct. App. 1964) (rejecting 
involuntariness claim by fifteen-year-old in rape case even though youth had I.Q. of seventy-
four and was questioned late at night after having been in police custody for roughly ten hours, 
and had had little food or water; majority stresses that youth ―never asked for either food or 
water‖ and that the youth ―had sufficient reasoning ability to give the sheriff an alibi when he 
was first accosted, and was self-assertive enough to curse the sheriff‖); State v. Carder, 210 
N.E.2d 714, 718–19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965) (rejecting involuntariness claim by sixteen-year-old 
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The federal and state cases in which an involuntariness claim 
prevailed typically involved a far less serious type of crime (for 
example, theft or breaking and entering).
66
 In the only case we could 
find in which a confession was suppressed as involuntary even 
though the crime was very serious, the grounds for suppression were 
unusually compelling: a thirteen-year-old child, charged in Family 
Court with a fatal stabbing, had been interrogated continuously for 
seven hours, while being held incommunicado and denied ―any food 
during the seven hours of interrogation.‖67 
3. The Status of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law at the End 
of the Pre-Miranda Period 
The Supreme Court‘s decisions in Haley v. Ohio (1948) and 
Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) offered great promise for a 
jurisprudence recognizing the special characteristics of youth in 
assessing the constitutional validity of a confession. But, as the 
foregoing review has shown, the Supreme Court‘s eschewal of 
standards and principles to guide the due process analysis of the 
voluntariness of a confession left the lower courts with too little 
guidance and too free a hand, and the lower courts were able to apply 
or distinguish the decisions in order to reach whatever result the 
lower court might wish. 
 
who was convicted of first-degree murder; court distinguishes Haley and Gallegos by stating 
that ―it is apparent that the accused was treated with unusual fairness and consideration by the 
officers‖ and that, although the police told the youth‘s parents and a lawyer they brought with 
them that the interrogation had to finish before they could see the youth, ―there is evidence that 
the accused did not wish to see his parents or the attorney‖). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160, 162, 169–70 (D. Mont. 1964) 
(sixteen-year-old was convicted of breaking and entering a post office with intent to commit 
larceny; confession was deemed involuntary because of defendant‘s age, overnight 
confinement; and denial of access to ―any relative, friend or lawyer‖); State ex rel. Garland, 160 
So.2d 340, 341, 343 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (fifteen-year-old was convicted of multiple burglaries; 
confession was suppressed because of defendant‘s age, prolonged interrogation, and denial of 
access to ―friends, parents or persons standing in loco parentis or attorneys‖); In re Williams, 
267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 96, 106 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1966) (fifteen-year-old was convicted of breaking and 
entering; confession was found involuntary because of ―the boy‘s age, the unlawfulness of his 
arrest by the security guard, the lateness of the hour, the duration of the detention and the 
absence of his parents, a lawyer or a friend‖). 
 67. In re Rutane, 234 N.Y.S.2d 777, 778–80 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1962). 
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In the latter half of the 1960s, the Supreme Court issued two 
decisions that had great implications for juvenile confession 
suppression law. The 1967 Gault decision created opportunities for 
clarifying the import of Haley and Gallegos and using these decisions 
to build a viable jurisprudence of juvenile confession suppression 
law. Instead of facilitating that development, Miranda led to the 
sidelining of the involuntariness doctrine in juvenile cases. 
B. From Miranda (1966) to Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 
1. Miranda: The Rule and Its Reasoning 
By the early 1960s, the Supreme Court was acutely aware—from 
the involuntariness cases that the Court had decided and from the 
many other cases that came before the Court in certiorari petitions—
of the manifold types of abuses that took place at the police 
stationhouse in interrogations of suspects. As Justice Frankfurter 
wrote in his 1961 Culombe opinion, the Court had come to 
understand that the police were adept at coercing confessions through 
devices ―subtler‖ than ―ropes and a rubber hose‖: police officers 
regularly extracted confessions by means of ―[k]indness, cajolery, 
entreaty, [and] deception.‖68 Until the mid-1960s, the central 
constitutional check on such actions by state and local police officers 
was, as Justice Frankfurter put it, ―what due process of law requires 
by way of restricting the state courts in their use of the products of 
police interrogation.‖69 This was the backdrop for the Court‘s 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona
70
 in 1966. 
The rule adopted in Miranda is, of course, well known to every 
lawyer who ever took a criminal procedure course in law school—or 
even a bar review course—as well as to anyone who has ever read or 
watched a crime drama. But this basic rule, stated succinctly and with 
impressive clarity in an early passage of Chief Justice Warren‘s 
opinion for the Court in Miranda,
71
 has been elaborated, extended, 
 
 68. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., announcing 
the judgment of the Court). 
 69. Id. at 587. 
 70. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 71. See id. at 444–45. It was not until 2000, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
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and often limited in the almost half-century of subsequent decisions. 
Under Miranda jurisprudence, ―custodial interrogation‖72 triggers an 
obligation on the part of the police to give the well-known 
warnings,
73
 and a failure to do so, or to convey a ―fully effective 
equivalent,‖74 will ordinarily75 result in suppression unless the 
accused makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver
76
 of their 
 
(2000), that the Court clarified that ―Miranda announced a constitutional rule,‖ notwithstanding 
the Court‘s previous references to the ―Miranda warnings as ‗prophylactic.‘‖ See id. at 437, 
444. 
 72. ―Custodial interrogation‖ is, in this context, a term of art, limiting the police 
obligation to administer Miranda warnings to situations in which a suspect (1) is in ―custody‖ 
or ―otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way,‖ Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444; see also id. at 477, 478, and (2) is subjected to ―interrogation,‖ which has been 
defined as ―express questioning‖ or ―any words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.‖ Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291, 300–01 (1980). 
 73. The warnings, as set forth in the Miranda opinion, are that the suspect (1) has a right 
to remain silent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467–68; (2) that any statement he or she 
makes can and will be used in court as evidence against him or her, id. at 469; (3) that the 
suspect has a right ―to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him [or her] during 
interrogation,‖ id. at 471; and (4) that if the suspect cannot afford a lawyer, he or she has a right 
to have a lawyer appointed without cost to represent him or her ―prior to any interrogation,‖ id. 
at 474. 
 74. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989) (warnings must be ―‗a fully 
effective equivalent‘‖ of the Miranda language, and ―reasonably ‗conve[y] to [a suspect] his 
rights as required by Miranda‘‖) (emphasis in original) (alterations in original); see also Florida 
v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010). 
 75. The Court has recognized two general exceptions to the requirement to administer 
Miranda warnings in situations of ―custodial interrogations‖: (1) Under the ―booking 
exception,‖ the police need not administer warnings in order to elicit the ―‗biographical data 
necessary to complete booking or pretrial services,‘‖ Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 
(1990), such as ―name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age,‖ id., as 
long as the questions asked are ―reasonably related to the police‘s administrative concerns,‖ id. 
at 601–02, and are not ―‗designed to elicit incriminatory admissions,‘‖ id. at 602 n.14; and (2) 
under the ―public safety‖ exception of New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), ―when the 
police arrest a suspect under circumstances presenting an imminent danger to the public safety, 
they may without informing him [or her] of [the Miranda] . . . rights ask questions essential to 
elicit information necessary to neutralize the threat to the public.‖ Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420, 429 n.10 (1984) (describing Quarles rule). 
 76. There is, first of all, the question of whether a waiver took place at all. See Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–63 (2010). If there was a waiver, then (1) ―‗the 
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a 
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,‘‖ Colorado v. 
Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987); and (2) the waiver ―must have been made with a full 
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 
to abandon it.‖ Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  JDB and Juvenile Confession Suppression Law 127 
 
 
Miranda rights. In the event of a suspect‘s assertion of either the 
―right to silence‖ or the ―right to counsel,‖ the police are foreclosed 
from further questioning unless certain protections are afforded.
77
 
Reflecting the lessons that the Court learned about the nature of 
police interrogations in the voluntariness cases—and indeed, directly 
referencing some of those cases—the Miranda opinion explained that 
―the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically 
rather than physically oriented.‖78 The Miranda opinion drew on 
―police manuals and texts‖ to document the practices and ploys 
commonly used by police,
79
 and thereby laid the foundation for the 
Court‘s ultimate conclusion that adequate advisement of one‘s rights 
by means of the warnings is necessary ―to permit [a suspect] a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination‖ in the 
face of ―inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine 
the individual‘s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.‖80 The Miranda decision could be 
founded on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 
even though the case involved a state court prosecution, because, as 
Chief Justice Warren explained, the Court had, two years earlier, 
employed the incorporation doctrine to hold that ―the substantive 
standards underlying the privilege appl[y] with full force to state 
court proceedings.‖81 
 
 77. If the suspect asserts the right to silence, then ―the interrogation must cease,‖ 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74, but the police may resume questioning if the circumstances of 
the case show that the officers ―‗scrupulously honored‘‖ the suspect‘s assertion of the right to 
silence. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). If the suspect asserts the right to 
counsel, ―all questioning must cease,‖ Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam), 
until and unless ―counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates 
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.‖ Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). 
 78. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. 
 79. See id. at 448–59. 
 80. Id. at 467. 
 81. Id. at 463–64 (discussing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)). See also Malloy, 378 
U.S. at 6 (―We hold today that the Fifth Amendment‘s exception from compulsory self-
incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the 
States.‖). For discussion of the ―incorporation‖ doctrine, the mechanism by which the Supreme 
Court found much of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states, see supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
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2. Miranda, Gault, and a Lost Opportunity to Refine the Due 
Process Involuntariness Doctrine in Juvenile Cases 
As Part I.A.2 explained, the development of a vibrant juvenile 
confession suppression jurisprudence was impeded in the pre-
Miranda era at least in part by the nature of juvenile court practice at 
that time: the informality of the proceedings and the absence of the 
procedural safeguards of adult criminal court; the denial of counsel 
for an accused juvenile in many States; and the view of many lawyers 
that a juvenile defender should not litigate in an aggressive manner.
82
 
In re Gault,
83
 issued the year after Miranda, removed these 
obstructions and held that juvenile delinquency proceedings ―‗must 
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment‘‖; that 
the accused in a delinquency case is entitled to representation; and, 
although this was implicit in the opinion rather than explicit, that a 
lawyer for an accused child must zealously defend against the 
charges in the well-established manner of a defender in a criminal 
case.
84
 
Gault also furnished a prime opportunity for a newly-minted corps 
of juvenile defenders to build upon Haley and Gallegos to shape a 
vibrant set of due process regulations of police interrogations of 
youth. Although Gault took pains to explain that the primary focus of 
the decision was on the charging and fact-finding stages of a 
delinquency case—and not the ―pre-judicial stage[] of the juvenile 
process‖85—several passages of the opinion provided the makings of 
arguments for amplifying and refining the Haley-Gallegos doctrine. 
In the course of explaining that delinquency proceedings are 
necessarily subject to the regulations of the Due Process Clause, the 
Court approvingly cited its previous applications of the Due Process 
 
 82. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 83. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 84. Id. at 30, 35–42. See also HERTZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 7–9. 
 85. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. The Court also explicitly excluded the subject of ―the post-
adjudicative or dispositional process.‖ Id. See also id. at 27 (―nor do we here rule upon the 
question whether ordinary due process requirements must be observed with respect to hearings 
to determine the disposition of the delinquent child‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  JDB and Juvenile Confession Suppression Law 129 
 
 
Clause to ―prohibit the use of [a] . . . coerced confession‖ in Haley v. 
Ohio (1948) and Gallegos v. Colorado (1962).
86
 
More importantly, the Court expressly ruled that juveniles enjoy 
the privilege against self-incrimination.
87
 In holding that juveniles 
have the right to remain silent, Justice Abe Fortas made clear that this 
right applies throughout the entire criminal process, beginning at the 
investigative phase. As he explained, ―[t]he privilege against self-
incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards 
necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably 
trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but 
are reliable extensions of the truth.‖88 Emphasizing that the roots of 
this privilege go ―far deeper‖ than protecting against unreliable 
confessions, he stressed that the privilege‘s roots 
tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because 
the privilege reflects the limits of the individual‘s attornment 
to the state and—in a philosophical sense—insists upon the 
equality of the individual and the state. In other words, the 
privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which 
prevents the use of confessions which are the product of 
coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger 
of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, 
whether by force or by psychological domination, from 
overcoming the mind and will of the person under 
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide 
whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.
89
 
 
 86. Id. at 12–13 & nn.9–10. 
 87. Id. at 55. 
 88. Id. at 47. 
 89. Id. (footnote omitted). In a recently published history of the Gault case, which draws 
on Justice Fortas‘ papers (along with a large number of other written sources and interviews), 
David Tanenhaus reveals that Fortas, in an effort to persuade Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Brennan to join an opinion holding that juveniles deserve the constitutional protection of the 
Fifth Amendment (which they ultimately did join), circulated two recently issued decisions by 
prominent juvenile court judges (which are cited infra note 96) that stressed ―that young people 
were more susceptible than adults to confessing guilt to police officers.‖ DAVID S. TANENHAUS, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 84 (2011). 
For discussion of the sources that Tanenhaus consulted, see id. at 137–41. 
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The Court definitively rejected the view that ―the juvenile and 
presumably his parents should not be advised of the juvenile‘s right 
to silence because confession is good for the child.‖90 Recognizing 
that ―special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the 
privilege by or on behalf of children,‖91 the Court held unequivocally 
that ―the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is 
applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.‖92 
In doing so, the Court recognized that juveniles deserve 
heightened protection, which the Court termed ―differences in 
technique—but not in principle,‖ in ―administering the privilege.‖93 
Such ―differences in technique,‖ the Court explained, should account 
for ―the age of the child and the presence and competence of 
parents,‖ and whether there was ―participation of counsel.‖94 The 
Court quoted extensively from Haley to make the point that ―[t]his 
Court has emphasized that admissions and confessions of juveniles 
require special caution.‖95 It also approvingly referenced decisions of 
the New York Court of Appeals and New Jersey Supreme Court that 
reversed delinquency findings that were based on ―confessions 
obtained in circumstances comparable to those in Haley.‖96 The 
Court declared that it is essential to ensure that a juvenile‘s 
statements are neither ―the product of . . . adolescent fantasy, fright or 
despair‖ nor ―the product of ignorance of rights.‖97 
With Miranda‘s establishment in 1966 of important new 
constraints upon police interrogation to safeguard the Fifth 
 
 90. Gault, 387 U.S. at 51. 
 91. Id. at 55. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 45. 
 96. Id. at 46 (discussing In re Gregory W. & Gerald S., 224 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1966), and 
In re State ex rel. Carlo & Stasilowicz, 225 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1966)); see also id. at 52–54 (further 
discussing these lower court rulings). 
 97. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55. In an earlier passage of the opinion, in which the Court held 
that juveniles have a constitutional right to counsel in a delinquency case, the Court similarly 
emphasized the crucial role that counsel plays in ensuring that juveniles can exercise their 
constitutional rights: ―The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of 
law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to 
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child ‗requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.‘‖ Id. at 36 (quoting Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (footnote omitted)). 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Gault‘s clarification 
in 1967 that the privilege applies to juveniles in delinquency cases, 
and Gault‘s bolstering of the due process doctrine of Haley and 
Gallegos, one would expect that the new national corps of juvenile 
defenders would have embarked upon a course that actively 
challenged juvenile confessions on both Miranda and due process 
involuntariness grounds. A review of the reported decisions of the 
first decade after Gault shows that this was indeed the case with 
regard to Miranda claims, but that involuntariness claims were raised 
only rarely.
98
 
A particularly revealing gauge of the state of juvenile confession 
suppression practice a decade after Miranda‘s issuance can be found 
 
 98. Given the large number of cases that can be found throughout the United States during 
this period, the textual point is best illustrated by focusing on a single State and a discrete body 
of cases that will permit a viable survey of confession suppression motion practices. For this 
purpose, we used New York State because this State had a fully functional defense bar in 
juvenile court even before the Supreme Court‘s recognition of a right to counsel in 1967 in In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See id. at 40–41 (discussing New York State‘s statutory right to 
counsel in Family Court). We focused exclusively on New York Family Court practice during 
this period because there was an active corps of lawyers specializing in Family Court juvenile 
delinquency proceedings in New York City at this time. See generally PETER S. PRESCOTT, THE 
CHILD SAVERS (1981) (presenting history of New York Legal Aid Society‘s Juvenile Rights 
Division)). Also, New York Family Court lawyers had good reason to appreciate the vitality of 
an involuntariness claim given that such a claim had resulted in suppression of a confession in a 
homicide case in In re Rutane, 234 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1962) (discussed supra note 
67 and accompanying text). 
 For our search, we focused on the roughly ten-year period commencing with the 
announcement of the Miranda decision on June 13, 1966, and ending with the announcement 
on June 20, 1979, of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 
(1979), which (as discussed infra notes 111–19 and accompanying text), set limits upon the 
ways in which Miranda applies to juvenile cases. To limit our search to New York Family 
Court cases, we defined the Westlaw search to focus on cases within the New York database 
that have the words ―In the Matter of‖ or ―In re‖ in the caption of the case. We then conducted 
searches with the following search patterns: ―confession & suppress! & Miranda‖; ―confession 
& suppress! & Miranda & involuntar!‖; ―confession & suppress! & involuntar! % Miranda.‖ 
 This search produced fifteen cases in which defense counsel raised a Miranda claim. In one 
of these, defense counsel also raised an involuntariness claim. In a single case, defense counsel 
raised an involuntariness claim without also raising a Miranda claim. 
 Of course, the reported decisions, which are almost exclusively appellate, do not 
necessarily present an accurate picture of what confession suppression claims were raised at the 
trial court level by trial counsel. Issues raised below may not have been deemed by appellate 
counsel as sufficiently compelling to be presented on appeal. But the factors that we describe in 
the above text as creating a favorable climate for raising both Miranda and Due Process 
challenges to a juvenile confession at the trial level also would have provided reasons for 
raising these claims on appeal. 
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in a practice manual for juvenile defenders, published in 1977 by the 
National Juvenile Law Center and the American Law Institute-
American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional 
Education. The manual, entitled Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases, 
was written by experts on juvenile law with practice experience in 
four States.
99
 The manual covers each stage of a delinquency case, 
provides caselaw and practice pointers for juvenile defenders, and 
devotes an entire chapter to confessions.
100
 As one would expect, that 
chapter contained a lengthy section on Miranda rights and waiver.
101
 
There was also a section on statutory grounds for excluding a 
juvenile‘s confession.102 Surprisingly, there was no section or even 
subsection on suppressing a juvenile‘s confession as involuntary 
under the Due Process Clause. The seminal decisions on 
involuntariness of a minor‘s statement, Haley v. Ohio and Gallegos v. 
Colorado, appeared only briefly and tangentially in the manual‘s 
discussion of Miranda requirements.
103
 
What accounts for the manual‘s odd omission of an important, 
long-established constitutional basis for suppressing the confession of 
a juvenile? Based on our recollections of criminal and juvenile court 
practice of the era, refreshed and reinforced by our review of caselaw 
of that period, we believe that the drafting choice reflects a widely-
shared view of juvenile defenders at the time: Miranda was not only 
the better constitutional basis for seeking to suppress a confession, 
but essentially the only constitutional claim worth raising in most 
 
 99. See PIERSMA ET AL., supra note 60. The manual was first published in 1971 and 
thereafter expanded and re-issued in a second edition in 1974 and a third edition in 1977. See id. 
at ix. As the title page of the third edition shows, the book was the result of a collaboration 
between the National Juvenile Law Center and the ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing 
Professional Education. The title page also identified the practice sites of the authors: Piersma, 
Ganousis, Volenik, and Connell were identified as members of the Missouri Bar; Piersma as 
also a member of the Michigan Bar; Volenik as also a member of the Maryland Bar; and 
Swanger and Connell as members of the Pennsylvania Bar. 
 100. See id. at 69–101.  
 101. See id. at 70–86. 
 102. See id. at 86–90. 
 103. See id. at 80 (citing Gallegos to support the point that the age of the suspect is a factor 
to consider in evaluating the validity of a Miranda waiver); id. at 92 (citing Gallegos and Haley 
to argue for Miranda warnings at a probation intake interview of a juvenile at the initial stage of 
a delinquency case); cf. id. at 117–18 (citing Gallegos and Haley to argue for a more protective 
Fourth Amendment standard for assessing the validity of a juvenile‘s consent to a search). 
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cases.
104
 The involuntariness route had appeared to become a dead 
end because the amorphous nature of the involuntariness standard 
gave the lower courts free rein and these courts generally used their 
discretion to uphold confessions, particularly when the crime charged 
was a serious one. Miranda‘s issuance in 1966 seemed to open the 
door to substantial, realistic new opportunities for suppressing a 
juvenile‘s confession. In sharp contrast to the involuntariness 
doctrine‘s ―totality of the circumstances‖ standard, the Miranda 
doctrine created a set of sequential issues that lawyers and judges 
could employ as a concrete checklist: 
(1) Was there ―custodial interrogation‖?105 If so, Miranda 
applied. If not, it did not. 
(2) If Miranda applied, was the need to administer warnings 
nullified by either the ―booking exception‖ or the ―public 
safety exception‖?106 
(3) If Miranda warnings were required, were they administered 
in their proper form?
107
 
(4) If yes, did the suspect waive his or her rights, and, if there 
was a waiver, was it voluntary, knowing, and intelligent?
108
 
(5) If the suspect asserted the right to silence or the right to 
counsel, did the police respond in the manner required by such 
an assertion?
109
 
Moreover, as Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases points out, these 
issues were conducive to an argument that a particularly stringent 
standard should be applied in juvenile cases.
110
 
 
 104. That pattern is evident in the sample of cases of the period that is described supra note 
98. Here, we address only the federal constitutional bases for seeking suppression of a 
juvenile‘s statement. Suppression may also be available by means of various state constitutional 
and state statutory claims. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 514–29. 
 105. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra note 75. 
 107. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 110. See PIERSMA ET AL. supra note 60, at 74 (arguing that young age should be factored 
into analysis of ―custody‖ for Miranda purposes); id. at 79–80 (explaining that the age of a 
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The juvenile defenders of the 1970s who were pinning their hopes 
on the emergence of highly protective Miranda standards for 
juveniles were surely disappointed when the Supreme Court issued 
its first juvenile Miranda decision in 1979, Fare v. Michael C.
111
 The 
Court overturned a lower court‘s ruling that ―a juvenile‘s request, 
made while undergoing custodial interrogation, to see his probation 
officer is per se an invocation of the juvenile‘s Fifth Amendment 
rights as pronounced in Miranda.‖112 A suspect‘s request to see a 
probation officer, the Court held, cannot be equated with a request for 
counsel (with the attendant protections that assertion of the right to 
counsel entails
113), ―[w]hether it is a minor or an adult who stands 
accused.‖114 Addressing the broader question of how to administer 
the Miranda waiver rule in juvenile cases,
115
 the Court held that the 
customary adult court ―totality-of-the-circumstances approach is 
adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where 
interrogation of juveniles is involved.‖116 The Court suggested the 
need for a more exacting analysis in juvenile cases, stating that the 
―circumstances‖ to be considered in this ―totality‖ analysis should 
―include[] evaluation of the juvenile‘s age, experience, education, 
 
suspect is generally treated as a factor in assessing the validity of waiver of Miranda rights); id. 
at 82–85 (discussing argument that ―absence of a juvenile‘s parents . . . or the ineffective or 
imprudent advice of a youth‘s parents‖ should be factored into the assessment of validity of 
Miranda waiver). 
 111. 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 112. Id. at 709. 
 113. As explained supra note 77 and accompanying text, a suspect‘s request for counsel 
during custodial interrogation requires that interrogation cease. See also Fare, 442 U.S. at 717–
18. 
 114. Fare, 442 U.S. at 719. 
 115. A subsidiary, threshold question in Fare v. Michael C. was whether the Miranda rule 
applies at all in juvenile delinquency cases. Id. at 717 n.4 (―this Court has not yet held that 
Miranda applies with full force to exclude evidence obtained in violation of its proscriptions 
from consideration in juvenile proceedings. . . . We do not decide that issue today. In view of 
our disposition of this case, we assume without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully 
applicable to the present proceedings.‖). Notwithstanding this footnote, the lower courts have 
uniformly applied Miranda to juvenile delinquency cases. For representative citations, see 
HERTZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 487–88. To the extent that there has been any question, any 
such doubts have been laid to rest by the Court‘s recent decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), which treats Miranda as so self-evidently applicable to delinquency 
cases that nothing even need be said about the matter. 
 116. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (―We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is 
required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether 
an adult has done so.‖).  
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background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to 
understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.‖117 
The way the Court applied this standard to the facts of the case before 
it, however, was unlikely to encourage lower courts to conclude that 
a suspect‘s young age should sway the analysis in run-of-the-mill 
cases. Explaining that ―no special factors‖ indicate that sixteen-and-
a-half-year-old Michael C. was ―unable to understand the nature of 
his actions,‖ the Court concluded that it is ―clear that respondent 
voluntarily and knowingly waived‖ his Miranda rights.118 The Court 
emphasized that Michael C. had ―considerable experience with the 
police,‖ ―had a record of several arrests,‖ ―had served time in a youth 
camp,‖ ―had been on probation for several years,‖ was ―under the 
full-time supervision of probation authorities,‖ ―[t]here is no 
indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the 
rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver 
would be,‖ and ―[h]e was not worn down by improper interrogation 
tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.‖119 
C. Juvenile Confession Suppression Law and Practice in the 1980s, 
1990s, and the First Half-Decade of the Twenty-First Century 
After issuing Fare v. Michael C. in 1979, the Supreme Court did 
not return to the subject of juvenile confession suppression until 2004 
in Yarborough v. Alvarado
120
 and then in 2011 in J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina.
121
 We discuss Yarborough and J.D.B. in Part II. But, before 
doing so, it is useful to discuss the evolution of juvenile confession 
suppression law and practice in the lower courts in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and the initial years of the twenty-first century leading up to 
Yarborough. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 726–27. 
 119. Id. Michael C. argued that ―any statements he made during interrogation were 
coerced‖ by police ―threats and promises‖ and that ―he repeatedly told the officers during his 
interrogation that he wished to stop answering their questions,‖ but the Court rejected these 
arguments, stating that ―[r]eview of the entire transcript reveals that respondent‘s claims of 
coercion are without merit.‖ Id. at 727. 
 120. 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
 121. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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With the Court‘s adoption in Fare of a totality-of-the-
circumstances standard for assessing juvenile waivers of Miranda 
rights, the analytic constructs for assessing voluntariness of a 
Miranda waiver and due process voluntariness of a statement became 
essentially identical. This point was explicitly ratified by the Supreme 
Court in two adult criminal decisions in the 1986–87 Term.122 Under 
this uniform standard, the central question of whether the accused‘s 
will was ―overborne‖ by law enforcement officials or other 
governmental agents is to be determined by considering a variety of 
relevant factors, including, in juvenile cases, the age of the suspect.
123
 
Although there is reason to use the same general standard to assess 
voluntariness in both contexts, the result has been to subject Miranda 
to the same lack of standards that has long hampered the lower 
courts‘ applications of the due process involuntariness doctrine. In 
 
 122. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (explaining that a central issue in 
assessing voluntariness of a Miranda waiver is whether the accused‘s ―‗will [was] overborne 
and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired‘ because of coercive police conduct‖ 
and identifying relevant factors by quoting Justice Frankfurter‘s opinion in Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169–70 (1986) 
(―There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a ‗voluntariness‘ inquiry in the 
Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context.‖). Connelly 
also clarified an aspect of the involuntariness doctrine that may have been apparent all along but 
had never been explicitly stated by the Court: that a confession can be found to be involuntary 
under the Due Process Clause only if there was some coercive conduct on the part of 
government agents, and it cannot be based exclusively on a suspect‘s mental illness or other 
personal characteristics. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165–67 (adopting this holding and 
characterizing it as inherent in the Court‘s ―‗involuntary confession‘ jurisprudence‖). But see id. 
at 177–78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (―While it is true that police overreaching has been an 
element of every confession case to date, . . . [t]he fact that involuntary confessions have always 
been excluded in part because of police overreaching signifies only that this is a case of first 
impression.‖). 
 123. In the 1986 Connelly decision (see supra note 122 and accompanying text), the Court 
made clear that even though a personal quality like mental illness cannot, by itself, render a 
statement involuntary, it is ―relevant to an individual‘s susceptibility to police coercion.‖ 
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165. This point was underscored several years later, with specific regard 
to the factor of young age, by the Court in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) 
(discussed infra Part II.A). In Yarborough, the Court declared that ―we do consider a suspect‘s 
age and [extent of prior] experience [with the criminal justice system]‖ when gauging, for 
purposes of assessing the ―voluntariness of a statement,‖ whether ―‗the defendant‘s will was 
overborne,‘ . . . a question that logically can depend on ‗the characteristics of the accused.‘‖ Id. 
at 667–68 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)) (majority opinion); 
see also id. at 668 (the ―characteristics of the accused‖ that are relevant to this assessment ―can 
include the suspect‘s age, education, and intelligence, as well as a suspect‘s prior experience 
with law enforcement‖) .  
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applying this standard (which might be better termed a ―standardless 
rule‖), the lower courts have occasionally suppressed a juvenile‘s 
statement as involuntary under the Due Process Clause
124
 or as a 
product of an involuntary waiver of Miranda rights.
125
 But such 
rulings have generally been limited to cases with extremely 
compelling showings of involuntariness.
126
 
In the 1980s, the juvenile defense bar turned its attention to using 
social scientific data about adolescence to try to establish special 
protections for juveniles with respect to Miranda‘s requirement that a 
 
 124.  See, e.g., Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 990, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(seventeen-year-old was ―sleep-deprived‖ and interrogated by ―tag team of detectives‖ in 
―relentless, nearly thirteen-hour interrogation‖); A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 800–01 (7th Cir. 
2004) (eleven-year-old with no prior court experience ―sat, alone, in the police interrogation 
room,‖ with ―[n]o friendly adult . . . present during the questioning,‖ and was ―continually 
challenged‖ by a detective who ―accused him of lying, a technique which could easily lead a 
young boy to ‗confess‘ to anything,‖ as a state-provided youth officer did nothing ―to protect 
Morgan‘s rights‖); Woods v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1986) (sixteen-and-a-half-
year-old with no prior court experience was ―awakened early one morning by police officers 
hovering in his bedroom, handcuffed and led away from home and family in a matter of 
moments,‖ and then taken to stationhouse interrogation room and ―confronted with graphic (if 
not gruesome) pictures of the . . . murder scene,‖ by ―two experienced (adult) police officers‖ 
who ―intentionally made misrepresentations to Woods about the sufficiency of the evidence 
against him‖); Thomas v. North Carolina, 447 F.2d 1320, 1321–23 (4th Cir. 1971) (fifteen-
year-old with I.Q. of seventy-two and limited education was questioned throughout the night, 
off and on, for ―some 17 hours after he was arrested‖); Ex rel. Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 2, 3–4, 7 
(Iowa 1976) (seventeen-year-old with I.Q. of seventy-one and fourth-grade reading level was 
questioned off and on throughout the night, without ―any consultation with a parent, guardian, 
custodian, adult friend or lawyer‖); State ex rel. Holifield, 319 So. 2d 471, 472–73 (La. Ct. 
App. 1975) (mentally retarded fourteen-year-old with I.Q. of sixty-seven, who ―functions on a 
third grade level and is unable to read,‖ ―was not permitted to call his parent or to talk to an 
attorney prior to signing either the waiver or the inculpatory statement‖); In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 
WI 105, ¶¶ 26–28, 31, 33–34, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 159–64, 699 N.W.2d 110, 117–19 (fourteen-
year-old with an I.Q. of eighty-four and limited prior involvement with the juvenile justice 
system was interrogated for five-and-a-half hours by officers who used ―psychological 
techniques‖ to induce him to confess and who ―specifically denied Jerrell‘s requests to call his 
parents‖).  
 125. See, e.g., Doody, 649 F.3d at 990, 1023; Woods, 794 F.2d at 297–98; In re Roderick 
P., 500 P.2d 1, 2–4, 7 (Cal. 1972) (mentally retarded fourteen-year-old with no prior arrests was 
awakened late at night at home, taken to police station, and interrogated, and, according to 
psychiatrist, ―became confused easily, was passive, [and] susceptible to suggestion‖); Ex rel. 
Thompson, 241 N.W.2d at 7–8; State ex rel. Holifield, 319 So. 2d at 472–73; Commonwealth v. 
Cain, 279 N.E.2d 706, 709–10 (Mass. 1972) (fifteen-year-old with ―no prior experience with 
police practices‖ was ―in an agitated state‖ and was denied access to his father). 
 126. See supra notes 124–25 (describing factors that caused courts to suppress a confession 
as either involuntary under the Due Process Clause or under Miranda on grounds of 
involuntariness of the accused‘s waiver of Miranda rights or both). 
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waiver of rights be ―knowing and intelligent.‖ This may have been 
partly a reaction to Fare, with its relegation of the voluntariness 
prong of juvenile Miranda waivers to a totality-of-the-circumstances 
standard. It is surely attributable in very large part to the publication 
of a 1981 book, Juveniles’ Waiver of Rights: Legal and 
Psychological Competence, by psychologist Thomas Grisso.
127
 The 
book, which was a follow-up to articles that Grisso published in 
1977
128
 and 1980,
129
 reported the findings of a three-year series of 
empirical studies of delinquent youth and adult criminal offenders 
that examined their ability to comprehend the words and phrases used 
in customary Miranda warnings and to grasp the nature and 
significance of the rights set forth in the warnings.
130
 These studies 
found the following: 
  ―As a class, juveniles of ages 14 and below demonstrate 
incompetence to waive their rights to silence and legal 
counsel. This conclusion is generally supported across 
measures of both understanding and perception in our 
studies, and in relation to both absolute and relative (adult 
norm) standards.‖ 
  ―As a class, juveniles of ages 15 and 16 who have IQ scores 
of 80 or below lack the requisite competence to waive their 
rights to silence and counsel.‖ 
  ―About one-third to one-half of juveniles 15 and 16 years of 
age with IQ scores above 80 lack the requisite competence 
to waive their rights when competence is defined by 
absolute standards (that is, the satisfaction of scoring 
criteria for adequate understanding). As a class, however, 
this group demonstrates a level of understanding and 
 
 127. THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES‘ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
COMPETENCE (1981). 
 128. J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study 
of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321 (1977). 
 129. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical 
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980). 
 130. For a description of the composition of Grisso‘s samples, see GRISSO, supra note 127, 
at 139–40; see also Grisso, supra note 129, at 1149–50. The testing instruments and study 
protocols are described in Grisso, supra note 129, at 1144–51. 
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perception similar to that of 17–21-year-old adults for 
whom the competence to waive rights is presumed in 
law.‖131 
This empirical data corroborated the findings of an earlier, more 
rudimentary study of juveniles‘ ability to comprehend Miranda 
warnings,
132
 and was supported by a later empirical study by 
Professor Barry Feld.
133
 
This data had a significant impact on at least some courts. The 
New Hampshire Supreme Court cited Grisso‘s data in holding on 
state constitutional grounds that ―before a juvenile can be deemed to 
have voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived‖ Miranda 
rights, ―he or she must be informed, in language understandable to a 
child, of his or her rights.‖134 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court and the Kansas Supreme Court referenced Grisso‘s data when 
these courts adopted a state common law rule that a parent or other 
concerned adult must be present during police interrogation of a 
juvenile, and that the juvenile must be permitted to consult with the 
adult.
135
 Other courts cited Grisso‘s data in granting suppression of an 
 
 131. GRISSO, supra note 127, at 193–94; see also THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING 
COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 113–55 (1986); Thomas Grisso, 
Adolescents’ Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Constitutional Provisions in 
Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 10–12 (2006); Michele 
LaVigne & Gregory J. Van Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language Zone: The Prevalence of 
Language Impairments among Juvenile and Adult Offenders and Why it Matters, 15 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL‘Y 37, 74–77 (2011). 
 132. See A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan C. Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 39, 53–54 (1970) (reporting on study of sample populations of delinquent and non-
delinquent youths that found that more than 90 percent of the juveniles failed to fully 
comprehend Miranda warnings, and that even a simplified version of the warnings did not 
remedy the comprehension problems). 
 133. See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical 
Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 28, 99 (2006) (reporting on examination of 
―quantitative and qualitative data—interrogation tapes and transcripts, police reports, juvenile 
court filings, and probation and sentencing reports—of the routine police interrogation of sixty-
six juveniles sixteen years of age or older whom prosecutors charged with a felony offense,‖ 
which produced findings that are ―very consistent with laboratory research . . . [and] tend[] to 
bolster the validity of developmental psychologists‘ experimental findings that younger 
juveniles do not understand their Miranda rights, lack adjudicative competence, and remain at 
greater risk to give false confessions‖). 
 134. State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 300–01, 304 (N.H. 1985). The court set forth a 
simplified juvenile rights form in an appendix to its opinion. See id. at 306–07. 
 135. In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1310–13 (Kan. 1998); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile 
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individual juvenile‘s confession in the case before the court.136 But 
some courts rejected the data and/or excluded expert testimony based 
on the data.
137
 
Thus, by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
there was a well-established (albeit largely undefined) jurisprudential 
basis for treating young age as a significant factor in assessing 
voluntariness for due process and Miranda purposes, and an 
empirical—and, in some jurisdictions, an accepted doctrinal—basis 
for finding that youth below a certain age are unable to make a 
―knowing and intelligent‖ waiver of Miranda rights, at least when the 
youth is advised with the customary Miranda warnings. The 
evolution of juvenile confession suppression law and practice 
continued with the Supreme Court‘s 2004 decision, Yarborough v. 
 
(No. 1), 449 N.E.2d 654, 656–57 (Mass. 1983). 
 136. See, e.g., A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 801 n.11 (7th Cir. 2004). See also In re Jerrell 
C.J., 2005 WI 105, 699 N.W.2d 110, 117 (referring generally to ―[s]cholarly research‖ as 
supporting the proposition that ―children are less likely to understand their Miranda rights‖ 
―[b]ecause their intellectual capacity is not fully developed‖). 
 137. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 869 A.2d 640, 652 (Conn. 2005) (upholding trial court‘s 
exclusion of testimony of defense expert who used Grisso protocol to evaluate fourteen-year-
old defendant‘s competency to understand Miranda warnings: ―On the basis of the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing, we simply cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ruling that the Grisso test [i.e., Grisso‘s protocol for evaluating competency] did 
not satisfy the [state law standard for admissibility of expert testimony]. . . . Of course, we do 
not foreclose the possibility that, in a future case, sufficient evidence regarding the reliability of 
the Grisso test will be presented such that it may be found to pass muster. . . .‖); People v. 
Hernandez, 846 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (―County Court did not err in 
precluding expert testimony proffered by the defendant concerning his performance on a battery 
of tests, known as the ‗Grisso instrument,‘ which is intended to assess a person‘s ability to 
knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights. The tests have not been generally accepted 
by New York courts and, assuming that their general acceptance among forensic psychologists 
has been established for purposes of Frye v. United States, the defense failed to establish a 
foundation for admissibility by demonstrating the ‗specific reliability of the procedures 
followed to generate the evidence proffered‘ by the proposed expert.‖) (citation omitted); 
People v. Cole, 807 N.Y.S.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling, at the conclusion of Frye hearing, that defense would not be permitted to 
present expert testimony at trial from ―a forensic psychologist regarding the administration and 
results of a ‗Grisso test‘ upon defendant—a device used to measure an accused‘s ability to 
comprehend Miranda warnings,‖ based upon trial court record ―that the tests had not gained 
sufficient acceptance for reliability and relevance in the scientific community, and the 
vocabulary used to gauge defendant‘s understanding of the Miranda warnings differed 
substantially from the warnings defendant received‖). 
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Alvarado.
138
 Because Yarborough is so inextricably intertwined with 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, it is best to discuss these decisions together. 
II. J.D.B. V. NORTH CAROLINA: FACTS, HOLDING, BACKSTORY,  
AND ANALYSIS 
A. Prelude: Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 
To examine what the Supreme Court held (and did not hold) in 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, and why the holding was far more limited 
than it otherwise might have been, it is crucial to recognize that 
Yarborough was a federal habeas corpus proceeding. As a result, the 
Supreme Court‘s and the lower federal courts‘ analyses of the factual 
and legal issues in the case were subject to the specialized rules of 
federal habeas corpus, including the limitations set forth by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
139
 
On direct appeal of Michael Alvarado‘s conviction, a California 
appellate court rejected his Miranda claim, ruling that the seventeen-
and-a-half year old had not been in ―custody‖ at the time he was 
questioned by the police at the stationhouse, and therefore Miranda 
did not apply.
140
 On federal habeas corpus review of this state court 
ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the state 
court‘s ruling was wrong on the merits. But, under AEDPA, a federal 
court cannot grant federal habeas corpus relief ―merely‖ because the 
state court improperly applied federal constitutional law; a grant of 
the writ requires that the federal court also find that the state court‘s 
ruling on the merits was either ―contrary to‖ or an ―unreasonable 
application‖ of ―clearly established‖ Supreme Court law, or was 
based on ―an unreasonable determination of the facts.‖141 The Ninth 
 
 138. 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
 139. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). For a general description of AEDPA and 
how it changed federal habeas corpus practice, see 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3.1–3.5, at 117–232 (6th ed. 2011 & 
Supp. 2012). 
 140. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 659. As explained supra note 72 and accompanying text, the 
Miranda rule applies only in situations of ―custodial interrogation.‖ Thus, even if there was 
―interrogation,‖ as there was in the Yarborough case, Miranda would not apply unless the 
individual who was questioned was in ―custody‖ at the time. 
 141. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006). This AEDPA-created limitation on federal habeas 
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Circuit granted the writ by ruling that the state court had 
―unreasonably‖ failed to apply clearly established Supreme Court law 
requiring that a minor suspect‘s age be factored into the analysis of 
Miranda ―custody.‖142 Readily acknowledging that the Supreme 
Court had never explicitly adopted such a rule, the Ninth Circuit 
found the rule to be implicit in the Court‘s holdings regarding 
juvenile confessions and a necessary ―extension‖ of that caselaw.143 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and denied habeas 
corpus relief in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
After explaining that there is some question about the propriety of the 
Ninth Circuit‘s approach of finding ―clearly established‖ Supreme 
Court law in an ―extension‖ of existing Supreme Court decisions,144 
Justice Kennedy rejected the Ninth Circuit‘s conclusion that the 
Court‘s prior caselaw can be read as calling for consideration of a 
minor suspect‘s age when analyzing ―custody‖ for Miranda purposes: 
Our opinions applying the Miranda custody test have not 
mentioned the suspect‘s age, much less mandated its 
consideration. The only indications in the Court‘s opinions 
relevant to a suspect‘s experience with law enforcement have 
rejected reliance on such factors. See [California v.] Beheler, 
463 U.S. [1121], at 1125 [(1983) (per curiam)] (rejecting a 
lower court's view that the defendant‘s prior interview with the 
 
corpus relief, which is established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and applies to state prisoner petitions 
filed pursuant to § 2254—but not to habeas corpus petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
or to federal-prisoner motions for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255—is explained in detail in 
2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 139, §§ 32.1–32.5, at 1745–1898.  
 142. See Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 852–55 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
 143. See id. at 852–54. 
 144. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004) (―The petitioner [state of 
California] contends that if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the 
facts at hand then the rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of the state-court 
decision. There is force to this argument. Section 2254(d)(1) would be undermined if habeas 
courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to existing law. At 
the same time, the difference between applying a rule and extending it is not always clear. 
Certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the 
necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt.‖) (citations omitted). For further 
discussion of the question of when a prior Supreme Court holding can be deemed broad enough 
to justify treating apparent ―extensions‖ of that holding as ―clearly established‖ for purposes of 
section 2254(d), see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 139, § 32.3 n.7, at 1771–75.  
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police was relevant to the custody inquiry); Berkemer [v. 
McCarty], 468 U.S. [420], at 442, n.35 [1984] (citing People v. 
P., 21 N.Y.2d [1], at 9–10, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, [232,] 233 
N.E.2d [255], at 260 [1967], which noted the difficulties of a 
subjective test that would require police to ―‗anticipat[e] the 
frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they 
question‘‖); 468 U.S., at 430–432 (describing a suspect‘s 
criminal past and police record as a circumstance ―unknowable 
to the police‖).145 
Addressing the due process involuntariness caselaw that does 
classify age of a minor as a relevant factor,
146
 which the Ninth Circuit 
viewed as necessarily ―extend[ing]‖ to the issue of Miranda 
―custody,‖147 Justice Kennedy stated: 
 There is an important conceptual difference between the 
Miranda custody test and the line of cases from other contexts 
considering age and experience. The Miranda custody inquiry 
is an objective test. . . . To be sure, the line between 
permissible objective facts and impermissible subjective 
experiences can be indistinct in some cases. It is possible to 
subsume a subjective factor into an objective test by making 
the latter more specific in its formulation. Thus the Court of 
Appeals styled its inquiry as an objective test by considering 
what a ―reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest 
or police interviews,‖ would perceive. 
 At the same time, the objective Miranda custody inquiry 
could reasonably be viewed as different from doctrinal tests 
that depend on the actual mindset of a particular suspect, 
where we do consider a suspect‘s age and experience. For 
example, the voluntariness of a statement is often said to 
depend on whether ―the defendant‘s will was overborne,‖ a 
question that logically can depend on ―the characteristics of the 
accused[.]‖ The characteristics of the accused can include the 
 
 145. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 666–67. 
 146. For discussion of this caselaw, see supra Part I.A.1. 
 147. See Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d at 850, 852. 
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suspect‘s age, education, and intelligence, as well as a 
suspect‘s prior experience with law enforcement. In 
concluding that there was ―no principled reason‖ why such 
factors should not also apply to the Miranda custody inquiry, 
the Court of Appeals ignored the argument that the custody 
inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance 
to the police, while consideration of a suspect‘s individual 
characteristics—including his age—could be viewed as 
creating a subjective inquiry. For these reasons, the state 
court‘s failure to consider Alvarado‘s age does not provide a 
proper basis for finding that the state court‘s decision was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established law [under 
section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA].
148
 
The specific phrasing of the above passage gives the impression 
that Justice Kennedy was signaling his view of the issue on the 
merits—whether the Miranda ―custody‖ determination should take a 
minor suspect‘s age into account—and not merely resolving the 
habeas corpus issue of whether the state court‘s failure to do so 
constituted an ―unreasonable application‖ of ―clearly established‖ 
Supreme Court law. But Justice Kennedy was careful to frame the 
passage in the terminology and concepts of habeas corpus analysis. 
Thus, in a key portion of the above passage, he wrote that ―the 
objective Miranda custody inquiry could reasonably be viewed as 
different‖ from the due process involuntariness doctrine when it 
comes to factoring in age of a minor suspect.
149
 
Even if Justice Kennedy‘s language may have suggested his own 
view of the underlying merits issue, and perhaps also that of other 
members of the Yarborough majority, it was apparent that such a 
position did not command a majority of the Court on the merits issue. 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor—
siding with the majority—explained her view that ―[t]here may be 
cases in which a suspect‘s age will be relevant to the ‗custody‘ 
inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona,‖ but this was not such a case 
because ―Alvarado was almost 18 years old at the time of his 
 
 148. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667–68 (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 667 (emphasis added). 
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interview‖ and because it is ―difficult to expect police to recognize 
that a suspect is a juvenile when he is so close to the age of 
majority.‖150 It appeared, therefore, that Justice O‘Connor took the 
view—as did the four dissenting Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, 
and Ginsburg)
151—that the Miranda ―custody‖ inquiry can take the 
age of a minor suspect into account in appropriate cases, even though 
she agreed with Justice Kennedy and the rest of the majority (Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) that existing 
Supreme Court law did not ―clearly establish‖ such a rule. 
Thus, the stage was set for the Court‘s next step of resolving the 
issue on the merits in a direct appeal case. That is precisely what 
happened seven years later in J.D.B. v. North Carolina. By then, as 
the next section relates, the composition of the Court had changed, 
and the Court had wrestled in other cases with the question of 
whether the age of a defendant should matter in the application of 
criminal law and procedure. 
B. J.D.B.: Facts, Holding, and Backstory 
J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old, seventh-grade student, was questioned 
at his school by two police officers for thirty to forty-five minutes in 
a ―closed-door conference room.‖152 Two school administrators were 
present but J.D.B. was not given the opportunity to speak to his legal 
guardian (his grandmother) or to have her or another family member 
present.
153
 Nor was he administered his Miranda warnings or 
―informed that he was free to leave the room.‖154 In response to this 
police questioning, J.D.B. made inculpatory statements.
155
 When 
J.D.B. was subsequently charged in juvenile court with one count of 
breaking and entering and one count of larceny, his court-appointed 
public defender moved to suppress the statements on both Miranda 
 
 150. Id. at 669 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 151. See id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.) 
(―Common sense, and an understanding of the law‘s basic purpose in this area, are enough to 
make clear that Alvarado‘s age—an objective, widely shared characteristic about which the 
police plainly knew—is also relevant to the inquiry.‖). 
 152. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2399–2400. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
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and due process involuntariness grounds.
156
 The trial court denied the 
motion on both grounds, ruling that J.D.B. was not in ―custody‖ at 
the time of the questioning and accordingly Miranda did not apply, 
and that the statement was voluntary.
157
 The North Carolina Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court‘s denial of the suppression motion, 
expressly rejecting J.D.B.‘s argument that his age should be factored 
into the analysis of Miranda ―custody,‖ and left the due process 
involuntariness issue entirely unaddressed.
158
 The Supreme Court 
granted J.D.B.‘s petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of 
―whether the Miranda custody analysis includes consideration of a 
juvenile suspect‘s age.‖159 
The Supreme Court‘s holding in J.D.B. can be stated quite 
succinctly, although we have much to say in the remainder of this 
Article about how the Court reached this result and the implications 
of the holding and its underlying reasoning. The holding was stated, 
in a straightforward manner, by Justice Sotomayor in the opening 
paragraph of her opinion for the majority in a 5–4 ruling: 
 This case presents the question whether the age of a child 
subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody 
analysis of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is 
beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to 
police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances 
would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or 
courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we 
hold that a child‘s age properly informs the Miranda custody 
analysis.
160
 
 
 156. Id. at 2400. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. (describing North Carolina Supreme Court‘s ruling in In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 
135, 140 (2009)). The North Carolina Supreme Court‘s ruling was an affirmance of an 
intermediate state appellate court ruling affirming the trial court. See id. (describing decision of 
North Carolina Court of Appeals in In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 159. Id.; see also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (granting petition for writ 
of certiorari). As the Court noted in its opinion in J.D.B., the voluntariness issue was not before 
the Court because the North Carolina Supreme Court did not rule on this issue. J.D.B., 131 S. 
Ct. at 2400 n.3. 
 160. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2398–99; see also id. at 2401–06. 
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Far less straightforward, and requiring much more discussion, is how 
this position ended up commanding a majority of the Court. 
As Part II.A‘s discussion of Yarborough v. Alvarado explained, 
the majority‘s opinion there appeared to signal that the Court was 
leaning towards the view that the Miranda custody determination 
should not take account of a minor suspect‘s age.161 The fifth member 
of the Yarborough majority, Justice O‘Connor, seemed to lean in the 
opposite direction,
162
 and the four dissenters in that case (Justices 
Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) explicitly announced their 
view that age of a minor suspect is relevant to the Miranda custody 
determination.
163
 
In the seven years between Yarborough‘s issuance and the ruling 
in J.D.B., there were significant changes in the composition of the 
Court. Two members of the Yarborough majority were replaced by 
new members of the Court: Chief Justice John Roberts succeeded 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Justice Samuel Alito was 
appointed to Justice O‘Connor‘s seat. Two of the Yarborough 
dissenters had also stepped down from the Court: Justice David 
Souter, succeeded by Justice Sotomayor, and Justice John Paul 
Stevens by Justice Elena Kagan. 
Based on the line-up of Justices in Yarborough and the voting 
patterns of the Justices who had joined the Court since Yarborough, it 
seemed likely that J.D.B. would hold the exact opposite of what 
Justice Sotomayor announced in the opening paragraph of J.D.B. 
Given their votes in Yarborough, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas seemed likely to vote for a ruling that a suspect‘s age does 
not matter. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito had shown in 
previous cases that they favored a narrow view of Miranda and were 
likely to vote for the State in cases presenting novel questions about 
how to define and apply Miranda rules.
164
 Thus, even if both Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan supported Justices Stephen Breyer‘s and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg‘s already-announced view that age does matter, it 
 
 161. See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 164. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. 
Ct. 1213 (2010); Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
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appeared that there was at least a five-Justice majority that would rule 
against J.D.B. 
The wild card turned out to be Justice Kennedy. Although his 
majority opinion in Yarborough appeared to be a strong sign of how 
he would vote in J.D.B., he joined the two Yarborough dissenters and 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in holding that the Miranda ―custody‖ 
determination should account for a minor suspect‘s age. The 
dissenters in J.D.B., Justices Scalia and Thomas, held fast to what 
appeared to be their position in Yarborough, and Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito voted as predicted based on their positions 
in prior Miranda cases. 
If Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion in Yarborough was indeed a 
barometer of his view on the merits in 2004, what accounts for his 
remarkable shift of position in J.D.B.? In posing this question, it is 
important to underscore that, of course, Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in 
Yarborough was not a ruling on the merits, but merely a habeas 
corpus decision on whether a lower court‘s view of the merits was 
―reasonable.‖165 This very point was made by Justice Sotomayor in 
her majority opinion in J.D.B., explaining that the Court‘s prior 
ruling in Yarborough posed no impediment to a ruling in favor of 
J.D.B.
166
 Yet, as explained earlier, Justice Kennedy‘s language in 
Yarborough certainly seemed to signal how he felt about the merits at 
that point in time.
167
 If we are correct, then what might account for 
his reaching precisely the opposite conclusion when it came time to 
rule on the merits in J.D.B.? 
 
 165. See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text. 
 166. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011) (―Our prior decision in 
Alvarado in no way undermines these conclusions [about the propriety of factoring a minor 
suspect‘s age into the assessment of Miranda ―custody‖]. In that case, we held that a state-court 
decision that failed to mention a 17–year–old‘s age as part of the Miranda custody analysis was 
not objectively unreasonable under the deferential standard of review set forth by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214. Like the 
North Carolina Supreme Court here, we observed that accounting for a juvenile‘s age in the 
Miranda custody analysis ‗could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry,‘ Yarborough, 541 
U.S. at 668. We said nothing, however, of whether such a view would be correct under the law. 
Cf. Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1865 n.3 (2010) (‗[W]hether the [state court] was right or 
wrong is not the pertinent question under AEDPA‘). To the contrary, Justice O‘Connor‘s 
concurring opinion explained that a suspect's age may indeed ‗be relevant to the ‗custody‘ 
inquiry.‘ Alvarado, 541 U.S., at 669.‖) (citations omitted). 
 167. See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Fifth Vote: Justice Kennedy’s Evolving Conception of the 
Relevance of Youth in Criminal Law and Procedure 
During the period between Yarborough and J.D.B., Justice 
Kennedy authored two seminal decisions for the Court on the 
relevance of youth in criminal sentencing. In 2005, the year following 
Yarborough, Justice Kennedy wrote for the 5–4 Court in Roper v. 
Simmons
168
 that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment bar on capital 
punishment for defendants below the age of sixteen—established in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma
169
 (1988)—should be extended to all 
defendants below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
170
 
Justice Kennedy‘s position in Roper was a dramatic shift. In 1989, 
Justice Kennedy joined with four other Justices in rejecting precisely 
this argument in Stanford v. Kentucky.
171
 Moreover, it was the first of 
a series of dramatic shifts he made in cases involving juveniles. In 
Roper, in which he led a majority of the Court to abrogate Stanford v. 
Kentucky, Justice Kennedy appeared to signal that Roper‘s ruling was 
necessarily limited to the context of capital punishment. In a passage 
explaining why the penological principle of deterrence does not call 
for the use of capital punishment for defendants below the age of 
eighteen at the time of the crime, he observed that the ―punishment of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole‖ is available to 
provide whatever deterrent is necessary in the case of ―a young 
person.‖172 Yet, five years later, Justice Kennedy authored a majority 
opinion in Graham v. Florida,
173
 extending Roper‘s reasoning to hold 
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments also prohibit a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole in a non-homicide case in 
 
 168. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 169. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 170. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 171. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The ruling in Stanford was the product of a plurality opinion by 
Justice Scalia, which was joined in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and 
Kennedy, and which was joined in part by Justice O‘Connor, who wrote separately to explain 
her divergences.  
 172. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572 (―To the extent the juvenile death penalty might 
have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.‖). 
 173. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
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which the defendant was under eighteen at the time they committed 
the crime.
174
 
Justice Kennedy‘s voting pattern, along with the language that he 
used in his opinions for the majority in Roper and Graham, suggests 
an evolving understanding of the nature of adolescence and its 
relevance to constitutional regulation in criminal cases. In Roper, 
after explaining that legislative enactments and other indicia suggest 
an emerging national consensus condemning the use of the death 
penalty for juveniles,
175
 Justice Kennedy wrote extensively and 
eloquently about the developmental factors that justify treating the 
age of majority (18) as the dividing line: 
 Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First, as 
any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies 
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ―[a] lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are 
found in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young. These qualities often result 
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions. . . .‖ 
 The second area of difference is that juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure. . . . 
 
 174. Id. at 2034.  
 175. In accordance with the Court‘s established approach to Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis, Justice Kennedy began by examining ―objective indicia of consensus‖ 
with regard to the use of the death penalty for juveniles, ―as expressed in particular by the 
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.‖ Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. This 
review yielded evidence of a ―trend toward abolition of the juvenile death penalty,‖ id. at 566, 
along with a ―rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States‖ and ―infrequency 
of its use even where it remains on the books,‖ id. at 567. Justice Kennedy then moved on to the 
equally essential Eighth Amendment step of ―exercis[ing] . . . [the Court‘s] own independent 
judgment‖ on the issue. Id. at 564. The latter stage of the analysis contained Justice Kennedy‘s 
examination of the developmental factors that distinguish childhood from adulthood. Id. at 568–
75. 
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 The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile 
is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits 
of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.
176
 
In identifying these inherent characteristics of youth, Justice 
Kennedy cited to social scientific studies
177
 (including Erik Erikson‘s 
classic work on youth development
178
) and to prior Court decisions 
that recognized some of these qualities.
179
 He acknowledged that 
―[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the 
objections always raised against categorical rules,‖ especially given 
that the ―qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
disappear when an individual turns 18,‖ but he explained that ―a line 
must be drawn‖ and that it is appropriate to draw it at age eighteen, 
―the point where society draws the line for many purposes between 
childhood and adulthood.‖180 
Notably, the four dissenting Justices in Stanford v. Kentucky made 
precisely the same points about the nature of adolescence and the 
reasons for designating age eighteen as the minimum age for 
eligibility for the death penalty
181
 but failed to win Justice Kennedy‘s 
vote at that time. Justice Kennedy‘s subsequent opinion in Roper 
suggests that he did not feel able to rely on such considerations in 
Eighth Amendment analysis until there had been a pronounced shift 
in the national consensus against using the death penalty for 
juveniles.
182
 Upon doing so in Roper, he delved deeply into the social 
scientific literature and found reason to view juveniles as 
categorically different from adults. 
Having drawn this chronological line and having vested it with 
great constitutional significance, Justice Kennedy embraced the full 
 
 176. Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 177. See id. (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, 
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). 
 178. See id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)). 
 179. See id. at 569–70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993); Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
 180. Id. at 574. 
 181. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 393–99 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, 
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.). 
 182. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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implications of this conclusion when it came time, five years later in 
Graham v. Florida, to consider the constitutionality of a sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole for a defendant under the age of 
eighteen in a nonhomicide case. Quoting his earlier statements in 
Roper, Justice Kennedy explained that, as ―Roper established,‖ 
―juveniles have lessened culpability‖ and ―are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments‖ because ―[a]s compared to adults, 
juveniles have a ‗―lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility‖‘; they ‗are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure‘; and their 
characters are ‗not as well formed.‘‖183 
Justice Kennedy elaborated on his Roper statements by drawing 
on more recent social scientific literature, specifically the briefs of 
amici curiae in the Graham case, and other literature: 
 No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court‘s 
observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As 
petitioner‘s amici point out, developments in psychology and 
brain science continue to show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the 
brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through 
late adolescence. See Brief for American Medical Association 
et al. as Amici Curiae 16–24; Brief for American 
Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 22–27. 
Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their 
actions are less likely to be evidence of ―irretrievably depraved 
character‖ than are the actions of adults. Roper, 543 U.S., at 
570. . . . It remains true that ―[f]rom a moral standpoint it 
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with 
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's 
character deficiencies will be reformed.‖ Ibid. . . . 
 . . . As some amici note, the features that distinguish 
juveniles from adults also put them at a significant 
disadvantage in criminal proceedings. . . . Difficulty in 
weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding 
 
 183. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
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impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as 
part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to 
poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense.
184
 
Relying on these and other factors, the Court in Graham again used 
age eighteen as the dividing line, this time for the constitutional point 
of eligibility for a sentence of life imprisonment with parole in a non-
homicide case.
185
 
Although the Court in Roper and Graham had no reason to 
comment on the implications of the foregoing qualities of youth for 
the validity of a confession taken from a juvenile suspect by the 
police, those implications were readily apparent. In J.D.B., the Court 
made the connection explicit, drawing directly on Roper and Graham 
and linking these decisions to the Court‘s equivalent statements about 
youth many decades earlier in Haley and Gallegos: 
Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, we 
have observed that events that ―would leave a man cold and 
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early 
teens.‖ Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality 
opinion); see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 
(1962) (―[N]o matter how sophisticated,‖ a juvenile subject of 
police interrogation ―cannot be compared‖ to an adult subject). 
Describing no one child in particular, these observations 
restate what ―any parent knows‖—indeed, what any person 
knows—about children generally. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569. . . . 
 Although citation to social science and cognitive science 
authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense 
propositions, the literature confirms what experience bears out. 
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) 
(―[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds.‖).186 
 
 184. Id. at 2026–27, 2032. 
 185. See id. at 2034. 
 186. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 & n.5; see also id. at 2403 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982), for proposition that ―[a] child‘s age is far ‗more than a chronological 
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When one appreciates the extent to which Justice Kennedy‘s post-
Yarborough analysis in Roper (regarding the inherent qualities of 
youth) led inexorably to Graham and then to J.D.B., it is not at all 
surprising that Justice Kennedy joined the majority in J.D.B. 
notwithstanding whatever he may have said and felt at the time of 
Yarborough. Indeed, this would be just a single—and, actually a 
relatively small—part of a pattern he has exhibited of opening his 
mind to social scientific evidence about adolescence and, where 
appropriate, open-mindedly reconsidering his previously-held 
positions to fit what he has learned from that scientific evidence. 
D. J.D.B.’s Use of Legislative Fact 
The Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. passages quoted in the 
immediately preceding section reflect a significant difference 
between Justice Kennedy‘s use of social scientific data about youth in 
Roper and Graham and Justice Sotomayor‘s approach in J.D.B. 
Whereas Justice Kennedy extensively cited and relied on the social 
scientific literature, Justice Sotomayor shifted the focus from the 
realm of social science to what she termed ―commonsense 
propositions‖ about the nature of adolescence, for which ―citation to 
social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary.‖187 In 
doing so, she returned to the Court‘s approach in Haley v. Ohio and 
Gallegos v. Colorado—both of which she quoted in this passage of 
J.D.B.—of relying on general, widely-held knowledge about the 
nature of youth.
188
 This is knowledge, she stressed, that ―‗any parent 
knows‘—indeed what any person knows—about children 
generally.‖189 
By shifting from a reliance on social scientific studies to what 
amounts to judicial notice of generally known facts, Justice 
Sotomayor probably has made it easier for the lower courts to apply 
the standard that emerges from J.D.B. in assessing Miranda 
 
fact‘‖ and citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 for proposition that children ―‗are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to . . . outside pressures‘ than adults‖). 
 187. Id. at 2403 n.5. 
 188. See id. at 2403 & n.5. 
 189. Id. at 2403 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
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―custody‖ in juvenile cases. As commentators have observed,190 the 
lower courts may experience difficulties in employing ―legislative 
facts‖—social scientific and other facts that ―inform[ ] a court‘s 
legislative judgment on questions of law and policy.‖191 In many of 
the instances in which the Supreme Court or a lower appellate court 
relies on legislative facts to shape a new standard, there is no need for 
the lower courts to deal with the underlying legislative facts. A prime 
example is Roper: In applying the rule that persons under eighteen 
are categorically ineligible to be sentenced to death, the lower courts 
have no need to address the social scientific data on which the Court 
relied to develop the rule
192
; the lower courts need only resolve the 
ordinarily simple and straightforward adjudicative fact question of 
whether the defendant was or was not eighteen at the time of the 
crime.
193
 As the next subsection points out, however, the standard 
that emerges from J.D.B. often requires lower court application of 
general facts about the nature of youth, including facts of this sort 
that the Supreme Court used as ―legislative facts‖ in Roper, Graham, 
and J.D.B. If Justice Sotomayor had tracked Roper and Graham by 
presenting these facts as ones that emerge from the social scientific 
literature, this could have led to disagreements in the lower courts 
about what role such social scientific facts can play in an individual 
 
 190. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial 
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1540–41, 1595, 1599–1602 (1987); 
Kenneth Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 75–76, 
91–92, 98; Arthur Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and 
the Flow of Information to the Justices, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1211, 1228–30 (1975). 
 191. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404 (1942). As Professor Davis explained in his classic article 
about legislative facts, such facts are to be distinguished from ―adjudicative facts,‖ which are 
facts about ―what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions 
were.‖ Id. at 402. 
 192. For discussion of this social scientific data, see supra notes 175–80 and accompanying 
text. 
 193. In some cases, this question will not be simple and straightforward because of 
discrepancies in a defendant‘s birth records or the absence of such birth records altogether. But, 
for the most part, the administration of the Roper standard is simple and straightforward. This 
can be contrasted with a parallel rule that bars the use of capital punishment if the defendant 
was mentally retarded. The latter rule, adopted by the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002), often may require adjudicative factfinding as to whether a defendant is 
―mentally retarded.‖ See, e.g., Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 222 (5th Cir. 2010); Thomas v. 
Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 760 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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case and whether such facts are subject to the specialized processes 
for adjudicating expert opinions. As we saw earlier,
194
 some lower 
courts rejected psychologist Thomas Grisso‘s empirical data on 
juveniles‘ ability to comprehend Miranda warnings, even as other 
lower courts relied on this same data to shape special constitutional 
rules and/or to suppress confessions in individual juvenile cases.
195
 
Indeed, even Roper and Graham set off debates about how social 
scientific data about juvenile capacity can and should be used by the 
courts.
196
 In Graham, Justice Kennedy largely avoided such questions 
about what has come to be known as ―adolescent brain science‖ by 
citing this social scientific data as illustrative and supportive of the 
Court‘s previous ―observations in Roper about the nature of 
juveniles.‖197 Justice Sotomayor took the next step of entirely 
reframing the facts about adolescent capacity as generally known 
―commonsense propositions,‖ which ―the literature confirms‖ but for 
which ―citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is 
unnecessary.‖198 
 
 194. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 196. See, e.g., Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child 
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 15 (2009); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent 
Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2011); Terry A. 
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 89, 94 (2009); Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth 
Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2009); see also ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, 
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008). 
 Much of the recent social scientific data on adolescent decisionmaking, adjudicative 
competence, and criminal culpability stems from studies sponsored by the MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. See, e.g., 
NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 
(2002); YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas 
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, 
(Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents Might Be Less Culpable than 
Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 744–45 (2000); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, 
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 251–52 (1996); see also About the Network: Our Purpose, 
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.adjj.org/content/about_us.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2011), for an 
explanation of its mission. 
 197. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (quoting supra text accompanying 
note 184). 
 198. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5.  
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This discussion highlights the long competing strains in 
confession suppression caselaw on how to deal with generally known 
facts about adolescent qualities that are relevant to confession 
suppression standards. The Supreme Court‘s decisions in Haley v. 
Ohio and Gallegos v. Colorado treated, as self-evident, the 
propositions that police officers‘ actions that ―would leave a man 
cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early 
teens,‖199 and that a juvenile, ―no matter how sophisticated,‖ ―cannot 
be compared with an adult.‖200 Although these statements were 
presented in the course of what reads like a legal analysis, it is readily 
apparent that they encompass factual judgments about the inherent 
qualities of juveniles. In the decades after Haley and Gallegos, 
litigants and lower court judges often turned to social scientific 
studies as bases for such factual judgments.
201
 Roper and Graham 
could be read as favoring this approach although, and as we 
explained above, they are best understood as fitting the specialized 
rubric of use of ―legislative fact‖ to support a new constitutional rule. 
J.D.B. revived the approach of Haley and Gallegos, a point that 
Justice Sotomayor made starkly plain, not only by her express 
reliance on these cases, but also by her relegation of the social 
science data to a footnote observing that ―citation to social science 
cognitive science authorities is unnecessary.‖202 
 
 199. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (quoted at greater length supra text 
accompanying note 42). 
 200. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. at 54 (quoted at greater length supra text 
accompanying note 52). 
 201. See supra notes 127–36 and accompanying text. Of course, this was not true across 
the board. In some instances, the lower courts presented such facts as general knowledge about 
the nature of adolescence. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 810 N.E.2d 879, 881–82, (N.Y. 2004) 
(establishing a more protective rule for the invocation of the state constitutional right to counsel 
in juvenile delinquency and juvenile offender cases because ―[c]hildren of tender years lack an 
adult‘s knowledge of the probable cause of their acts or omissions and are least likely to 
understand the scope of their rights and how to protect their own interests . . . [and they] may 
not appreciate the ramifications of their decisions or realize all the implications of the 
importance of counsel‖). 
 202. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5. 
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E. The Nature of the Standard that Emerges from J.D.B. 
An issue that divided the Court in J.D.B. was whether integrating 
the age of a suspect into the Miranda ―custody‖ assessment would 
convert what should be an ―objective‖ inquiry into a ―subjective‖ 
one. This issue first surfaced in the earlier case of Yarborough v. 
Alvarado,
203
 when Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority that habeas 
corpus relief was unwarranted because a state court could 
―reasonably‖ believe that factoring in the age of a juvenile suspect 
would be inconsistent with ―the objective [nature of the] Miranda 
custody inquiry.‖204 
In J.D.B., Justice Alito, in a dissenting opinion joined by three 
other Justices, took the position that the Miranda custody 
determination has been, and should remain, a ―one-size-fits-all 
reasonable-person standard.‖205 He argued that ―incorporating age 
into . . . [the Court‘s] analysis‖ is fundamentally inconsistent with a 
standard that ―[u]ntil today . . . [has] focused solely on the ‗objective 
circumstances‘ of the interrogation,‘ . . . not the personal 
characteristics of the interrogated.‖206 Justice Sotomayor, writing for 
the majority, responded that ―inclusion [of age] in the custody 
analysis‖ (assuming that the ―child‘s age was known to the officer at 
the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively 
apparent to a reasonable officer‖) is ―consistent with the objective 
nature of th[e Miranda] test‖ and is, more profoundly, ―a reality that 
courts cannot simply ignore.‖207 
In our view, Justice Sotomayor had the better argument. As 
Justice Sotomayor observed, ―in many cases involving juvenile 
suspects, the custody analysis would be nonsensical absent some 
consideration of the suspect‘s age.‖208 To support this point, she used 
the facts of the J.D.B. case itself, pointing out that the instant 
scenario—a seventh-grader‘s removal from a social studies class and 
 
 203. 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
 204. Id. at 667–68; see supra text accompanying note 148 for full quote. 
 205. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2410–18 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts C.J., Scalia 
& Thomas JJ.). 
 206. Id. at 2412.  
 207. Id. at 2406 (majority opinion). 
 208. Id. at 2405. 
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subsequent interrogation by a ―uniformed school resource officer,‖ 
with an ―assistant principal‖ present—is necessarily ―specific to 
children‖ and cannot logically be viewed through a lens that is 
uniformly calibrated for individuals of all ages.
209
 This example 
prompted Justice Alito to respond that Miranda can be adjusted to 
accommodate a schoolhouse setting.
210
 In turn, Justice Sotomayor 
replied that ―the effect of the schoolhouse setting cannot be 
disentangled from the identity of the person questioned.‖211 
We believe that a different type of example may more forcefully 
illustrate the above-quoted statement of Justice Sotomayor‘s, that ―in 
many cases involving juvenile suspects, the custody analysis would 
be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect‘s age.‖ 
Imagine, for a moment, the case of a ten-year-old—or for that matter, 
a seven-year-old—who is interrogated by the police.212 Merely 
invoking this scenario is sufficient to demonstrate that it is 
―nonsensical‖ (to use Justice Sotomayor‘s apt term) to apply an adult 
standard when assessing whether a reasonable child of that age would 
have felt free to terminate police questioning and depart.
213
 And, once 
that proposition has been accepted, then, as Justice Kennedy put it in 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 2417–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 211. Id. at 2405 (majority opinion). 
 212. Some states set a minimum age of ten for prosecution for a delinquency offense, see, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-104(1)(a) (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(i) 
(West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)(A) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, 
§ 5102(2)(c) (West 2011), but others permit prosecution starting at age seven, see, e.g., MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.119, § 52 (West 2008); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008). 
For examples of cases involving police interrogations of such young children, see In re S.H., 
293 A.2d 181, 182–83 (N.J. 1972) (ten-year-old); In re Julian B., 125 A.D.2d 666, 667–68 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (seven-year-old). 
 213. See, e.g., In re S.H., 293 A.2d at 184–85 (treating, as axiomatic, that ―[r]ecitation of 
the Miranda warnings to a boy of 10 even when they are explained is undoubtedly 
meaningless‖). As this example illustrates, the need for a special juvenile standard will often 
become apparent if, instead of considering the application of a ―one-size-fits-all‖ standard to a 
seventeen-year-old, one considers instead its application to a ten-year-old. Compare, e.g., 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 669 (2004) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―17 1/2–year–
olds vary widely in their reactions to police questioning, and many can be expected to behave as 
adults.‖), with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 827–28 (1988) (plurality opinion) (―One 
might argue . . . that there is no chronological age at which the imposition of the death penalty 
is unconstitutional and that our current standards of decency would still tolerate the execution 
of 10-year-old children. We think it self-evident that such an argument is unacceptable . . . .‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
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Roper, the only question that remains is where to draw the dividing 
line between childhood and adulthood, and the most logical place is 
―the point where society draws th[at] line.‖214 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF J.D.B. FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF 
CONFESSION SUPPRESSION LAW 
Although J.D.B. addressed only the single dimension of 
confession suppression law that was before the Court—the 
assessment of ―custody‖ for purposes of Miranda—we believe that 
the reasoning of Justice Sotomayor‘s majority opinion sweeps 
broadly. Part III.A examines the many other aspects of confession 
suppression law that should be reconsidered in light of J.D.B. Part 
III.B then proposes an even more extensive reconceptualization of all 
of juvenile confession suppression law that we regard as the best way 
to implement the teachings of J.D.B. 
A. Reshaping Juvenile Confession Suppression Law to Reflect the 
Lessons of J.D.B. 
1. Due Process Doctrine of Involuntariness 
As the Supreme Court recognized, the due process standard for 
assessing whether a statement was unconstitutionally involuntary is 
designed to be a ―subjective inquiry,‖ in which the question of 
whether the accused‘s ―will was overborne‖ turns upon ―the actual 
mindset of a particular suspect,‖ and must account for all relevant 
―characteristics of the accused,‖ including ―age, education, and 
intelligence, as well as a suspect‘s prior experience with law 
enforcement.‖215 But, as Part I‘s review of the lower courts‘ 
 
 214. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 215. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667–68 (2004) (citations omitted); see also id. 
at 667–68 (―we do consider a suspect‘s age and [extent of prior] experience [with the criminal 
justice system]‖ when assessing the ―voluntariness of a statement‖); accord J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (―[T]he due process voluntariness test . . . permits 
consideration of a child‘s age‖); id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (―[T]he Court‘s precedents 
already make clear that ‗special care‘ must be exercised in applying the voluntariness test where 
the confession of a ‗mere child‘ is at issue.‖) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) 
(plurality opinion)). 
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applications of this standard showed, the standard has been too 
―subjective‖ in a different sort of way: Because the Supreme Court 
has announced no criteria other than the very broad rule that the 
determination should be based upon the ―totality of the 
circumstances,‖216 the lower courts have applied the doctrine in a 
haphazard manner, usually rejecting involuntariness claims in all but 
the most extreme sets of circumstances.
217
 The lower courts have 
tended to treat the Supreme Court‘s findings of involuntariness in 
Haley v. Ohio
218
 and Gallegos v. Colorado
219
 as prototypes for when 
a statement can be found to be involuntary (i.e., as the minimum 
preconditions for such a finding) rather than what these cases really 
were: fact patterns that were so extreme
220
 that the U.S. Supreme 
Court intervened by granting certiorari and then invalidating state 
court convictions in an era in which confession suppression was 
extremely rare. 
What is needed now is a set of ―objective‖ criteria for the ―totality 
of circumstances‖ test to guide the lower courts in evaluating the 
various circumstances that may be present. J.D.B. provides some 
guidance for applying the involuntariness standard to a juvenile 
suspect. As Justice Sotomayor demonstrated in her use of Haley and 
Gallegos, these cases should be treated as recognizing the 
―commonsense propositions‖ that ―events that ‗would leave a man 
cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early 
teens,‘‖ and that ―a juvenile subject of police interrogation,‖ ―no 
matter how sophisticated,‖ ―‗cannot be compared‘ to an adult 
subject.‖221 J.D.B. shows further that Roper v. Simmons222 should be 
read as establishing that it is the ―common ‗nature of juveniles‘‖ that 
―they ‗are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures‘ 
 
 216. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 218. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
 219. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 220. For descriptions of the facts of Haley and Gallegos see respectively notes 37–48 and 
accompanying text (discussing Haley) and notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing 
Gallegos). 
 221. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403 & n.5 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 
599, and Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54). 
 222. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). For discussion of Roper, see supra notes 168–80 and 
accompanying text. 
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than adults.‖ As discussed earlier, Roper relied on social scientific 
data to establish these propositions,
223
 but the Court concluded in 
J.D.B. that these are ―commonsense propositions‖ for which ―citation 
to social science and cognitive authorities is unnecessary.‖224 ―Such 
conclusions,‖ J.D.B. teaches, ―apply broadly to children as a 
class.‖225 
Moreover, as the Court‘s opinion in J.D.B. shows, an assessment 
of the likely effects of the ―pressure of custodial interrogation‖ on 
juveniles must take into account the empirical finding that the risk of 
a false confession has been shown to be particularly ―acute . . . when 
the subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile.‖226 Although 
J.D.B. did not cite In re Gault,
227
 Gault recognized as early as 1967 
that there is a high risk in any juvenile case that a confession may be 
―the product of . . . adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.‖228 The 
 
 223. See supra notes 187–202 and accompanying text. For full quotation of the relevant 
passage of Roper, see supra text accompanying note 176. 
 224. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5. 
 225. Id. at 2403. 
 226. Id. at 2401 (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009) and Brief for 
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as amici curiae); see also Steven A. Drizin & 
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
891, 941–43 (2004) (presenting data on disproportionately high percentage of documented 
instances of false confessions involving juvenile suspects); In the Matter of Jimmy D., 938 
N.E.2d 970, 979 (N.Y. 2010) (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (―So long as juveniles cannot be 
altogether preserved from rigors of police interrogation, it would behoove us not to minimize 
the now well-documented potential for false confessions when suggestible and often impulsive 
and impaired children are ushered into the police interview room.‖; ―Children do resort to 
falsehood to alleviate discomfort and satisfy the expectations of those in authority, and, in so 
doing, often neglect to consider the serious and lasting consequences of their election. There are 
developmental reasons for this behavior which we ignore at the peril of the truth-seeking 
process.‖); Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for 
Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007); Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, 
Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the United States, 
1989 Through 2003, 95(2) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–53 (2005); Saul M. Kassin, 
Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo & Allison D. Redlich, 
Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 
8–9, 19, 30–31 (2010); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: 
A Review of the Literature & Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB. INT. 33, 52–53 (Nov. 2004); 
Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943 (2010); Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider & Lynda Tricarico, 
Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS. L. REV. 887 (2010). 
 227. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 228. Id. at 55. For a discussion of the Court‘s rationale on this point, see supra notes 95–97 
and accompanying text. 
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empirical data on false confessions by juveniles, as referenced in 
J.D.B., provides empirical confirmation for something that the Court 
in Gault knew as (to use Justice Sotomayor‘s term in J.D.B.) a 
―commonsense proposition.‖ 
How are these broad, categorical observations about the inherent 
nature of youth to be applied in an individual case in which a trial 
court must assess the voluntariness of a youth‘s confession? In 
answering this question, it is useful to consider the burden of 
persuasion on the issue of involuntariness.  
Federal constitutional law places the burden on the prosecution to 
show voluntariness of a statement by at least ―a preponderance of the 
evidence‖229; in some States, state law goes beyond this constitutional 
minimum by requiring that the prosecution prove the voluntariness of 
a statement ―beyond a reasonable doubt.‖230 When assessing whether 
the prosecution has proven that the individual juvenile freely and 
voluntarily confessed, a trial court should begin by applying the 
―general presumptions‖231 that ―children as a class‖ are ―‗more 
vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures‘ than adults‖232 and 
that they are likely to succumb to police interrogation by giving 
statements that are ―the product of . . . adolescent fantasy, fright or 
despair.‖233 The question in each case becomes whether, in light of 
 
 229. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); accord Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 
600, 608 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 678 
(1980).  
 230. See, e.g., People v. Jiminez, 580 P.2d 672 (Cal. 1978); State v. Carter, 412 A.2d 56, 
60 (Me. 1980); Lowe v. State, 800 So.2d 552, 554–55 (Miss. App. 2001); People v. Anderson, 
364 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 1977). 
 231. The term comes from Chief Justice Roberts‘ concurring opinion in Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), in which he explained that he ―agree[s] with the Court that Terrance 
Graham‘s sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment[]‖ but he reaches this 
conclusion by an approach that differs from the majority‘s adoption of a categorical rule barring 
such a sentence for all offenders who were below age eighteen in a nonhomicide case. Id. at 
2036. Chief Justice Roberts explained that he would begin in each individual case by applying a 
―general presumption of diminished culpability that Roper indicates should apply to juvenile 
offenders‖ and would then consider whether there is ―reason to believe that [the offender in a 
particular case] . . . should be denied th[at] general presumption.‖ Id. at 2040. The approach we 
propose in the above text essentially implements a model of this sort in the confession 
suppression context with regard to the ―general presumptions‖ about youth that were 
recognized in J.D.B. as relevant to juvenile confessions. 
 232. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 233. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
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the testimony adduced by the prosecution and defense, the 
prosecution has overcome these ―general presumptions‖ and has 
proven (by the requisite burden of proof) that the accused freely and 
voluntarily confessed. 
2. Miranda 
Although it has taken until now for J.D.B. to resolve the question 
whether the young age of a minor suspect should be factored into the 
―custody‖ prong of the Miranda threshold determination of 
―custodial interrogation,‖234 the Supreme Court indicated three 
decades ago that the ―interrogation‖ prong should account for the age 
of a minor suspect. In Rhode Island v. Innis,
235
 the 1980 decision that 
defined the standard for assessing whether an ―interrogation‖ took 
place,
236
 the Court explained that the applicable test—an objective 
assessment of whether the police used ―words or actions . . . that they 
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response‖237—should factor in, among other things, the ―unusual 
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion.‖238 
Thus, as the lower courts recognized, Innis called for consideration of 
a minor suspect‘s age in assessing whether ―interrogation‖ took 
place.
239
 The Supreme Court had not previously explained how to 
integrate this factor into the inquiry, but J.D.B. supplied the requisite 
guidance.  
 
 234. As explained supra note 72, the Miranda doctrine applies only in situations of 
―custodial interrogation,‖ and the threshold inquiry in any Miranda case is whether the accused 
was in ―custody‖ and subjected to ―interrogation.‖ 
 235. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
 236. See id. at 300–01. For the definition adopted in Innis, see supra note 72.  
 237. 446 U.S. at 302. 
 238. Id. at 302 n.8. 
 239. See, e.g., In re Ronald C., 107 A.D.2d 1053 (N.Y App. Div. 1985) (finding 
―interrogation‖ under Innis because police should have known that placing alleged burglar‘s 
tools in front of thirteen-year-old suspect was likely to elicit incriminating response); In re 
Julian M., 2006 WL 3782989, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2006) (finding ―interrogation‖ 
under Innis because police officer knew that suspects ―were juveniles‖ and thus reasonably 
should have known that ―by agreeing with Phaheem that she, too, would be upset if wrongly 
accused or by directly asking Julian why he did not think he belonged in custody,‖ juveniles 
would ―likely . . . interpret[] [these words as prompts for their further responses‖). 
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 Like the conjoined assessment of ―custody,‖ the ―interrogation‖ 
inquiry in a juvenile case should take into account the specific age of 
the accused, assessing whether the words or actions of the police 
were ―reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response‖ from a 
reasonable juvenile of the accused‘s age. In doing so, the trial court 
should keep in mind the ―commonsense conclusions,‖ ratified by the 
Court in J.D.B., that ―children ‗generally are less mature and 
responsible than adults,‘‖ that ―they ‗often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could 
be detrimental to them,‘‖ and that ―they ‗are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to . . . outside pressures‘ than adults.‖240 
If a reviewing court in a juvenile case finds that a statement was 
elicited by means of ―custodial interrogation,‖ thereby triggering 
Miranda‘s requirements, then most of the follow-up stages of a 
Miranda analysis will require juvenile-specific assessments akin to 
J.D.B.‘s. If Miranda warnings were given in a form that diverged 
from the wording approved in Miranda itself, then there will be a 
question of whether ―the warnings reasonably ‗conve[yed] to [a 
suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.‘‖241 This objective 
inquiry, like the one in J.D.B., must take into account the suspect‘s 
age in a juvenile case as well as J.D.B.‘s lesson that children ―possess 
only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them‖242 
and Roper‘s teaching that juveniles ―have limited understandings of 
the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors 
within it.‖243 
If the prosecution asserts that the accused implicitly waived his or 
her Miranda rights, then the prosecution must show both ―‗a course 
of conduct indicating waiver‘‖ and that ―the accused understood 
these rights.‖244 If there was a waiver, whether explicit or implicit, the 
 
 240. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 
(1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 241. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 
U.S. 195, 203 (1989)) (alteration in original). 
 242. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403. 
 243. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 244. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (quoting North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)); see supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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prosecution must prove by at least a preponderance of the evidence
245
 
(although state law may impose a higher standard
246
) that the waiver 
was ―‗voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,‘ 
and ‗made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.‘‖247 
If the lower courts apply J.D.B.‘s ―general presumptions‖ about 
the nature of youth fully and faithfully, surely most juvenile waivers 
of Miranda rights will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. J.D.B. 
warns that children must be assumed to ―lack the capacity to exercise 
mature judgment‖ and too ―‗often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them.‘‖248 Gault recognizes the grave risk that juvenile 
confessions may be ―the product of ignorance of rights.‖249 Social 
scientific data documents juveniles‘ inability to comprehend Miranda 
warnings.
250
 Accordingly, and especially given that a high percentage 
of the juveniles charged in criminal and delinquency cases come from 
backgrounds of limited and inadequate education,
251
 it seems difficult 
to imagine that many juveniles adequately comprehend their rights, 
let alone that they waive those rights with an adequate understanding 
of the potential consequences. Moreover, given J.D.B.‘s recognition 
 
 245. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)). 
 246. See, e.g., In re Jimmy D., 938 N.E.2d 970, 975 (N.Y. 2010) (prosecution bears burden 
of proving ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ that police complied with Miranda and all other 
constitutional and statutory requirements that are encompassed within state law concept of 
―voluntariness‖ of a confession). 
 247. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). 
 248. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion)). 
 249. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
 250. See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. 
 251. See, e.g., Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify, 
Accommodate, and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their 
Disproportionate Representation in the Delinquency System, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. 
ADVOC. 3, 3-4 (2003); Joseph B. Tulman & Douglas M. Weck, Shutting Off the School-to-
Prison Pipeline for Status Offenders with Education-Related Disabilities, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 875, 882 (2009–10); see also In re Benjamin L., 708 N.E.2d 156, 161 (N.Y. 1999) 
(observing, in decision establishing more protective, youth-specific, speedy trial rule under state 
constitution, that ―many youths in juvenile proceedings suffer from educational handicaps and 
mental health problems, which undermine their capacity to anticipate a future presentment and 
to appreciate the need to take self-protective measures‖). 
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that juveniles ―‗are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside 
pressures‘ than adults,‖252 it seems difficult to credit a juvenile‘s 
waiver as voluntary when it is made (as it usually is) in a police 
interrogation room by a child, confronted by one or more police 
officers and denied the support of a parent or other concerned adult. 
B. Learning from Past Mistakes and Old Wisdom 
If the lower courts take to heart the lessons of J.D.B. and revise 
Miranda standards for interrogation of juveniles in all of the ways 
proposed in Part III.A.2, then there is reason to hope that, as the 
Court put it in J.D.B., children will be able to enjoy the ―full scope of 
the procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees to adults.‖253 So 
too, the modifications of the voluntariness standard proposed in Part 
III.A.1 should help to ameliorate what the J.D.B. Court termed the 
voluntariness test‘s inadequacy as a ―barrier when custodial 
interrogation is at stake.‖254 
Although we hope this will come to pass, we are not sanguine 
about the likelihood. The history of the lower courts‘ applications of 
the involuntariness and Miranda standards in juvenile cases
255
 gives 
us reason to worry that the lower courts will limit J.D.B. to its 
specific context, treating it as nothing more than a requirement that a 
minor suspect‘s age be factored into the assessment of Miranda 
custody. And if that is what becomes of J.D.B., then it will 
accomplish little indeed. Even if lower courts apply J.D.B. to 
invalidate un-Mirandized juvenile confessions on the ground that the 
juvenile suspects must be deemed to have been in custody although 
that would have not been the case for an adult, and even if (as we 
assume) police departments respond by routinely giving Miranda 
warnings to juveniles in settings that the police might not otherwise 
regard as ―custodial,‖ this will not result in a constitutionally 
adequate Miranda procedure for juveniles. As the immediately 
preceding section discussed, a high percentage of juveniles are 
 
 252. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 253. Id. at 2408. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See supra notes 55–67, 137 and accompanying text. 
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incapable of making truly knowing and voluntary waivers of their 
Miranda rights. So, even if more juveniles are warned of their rights 
as a result of J.D.B., this will accomplish little if the lower courts 
continue to uphold waivers of rights by juveniles who have been 
Mirandized.  
The rule adopted in Miranda (and now adapted to juveniles in 
J.D.B.) is, and always has been, a means to an end. The end is to 
ensure that suspects are advised of their rights so that a suspect can 
make a truly knowing and voluntary decision whether to waive those 
rights. If, as we believe, the vast majority of juveniles are incapable 
of making a truly knowing and voluntary waiver, then the Miranda 
rule cannot function in juvenile cases in the way that it was intended.  
For this reason, we believe that the system of constitutional 
regulation of juvenile interrogation needs to be completely 
overhauled and replaced with a more protective standard that ensures 
lower court compliance. Moreover, even if lower courts could be 
counted on to apply J.D.B. rigorously in all of the ways proposed in 
Part III.A, we still worry that the police could easily do an end run 
around these protections. Our fear is based on the pattern of police 
behavior in the years before and after the Miranda decision. 
Although the Miranda rule was specifically designed by the Court to 
counter the interrogation techniques that the police had developed to 
bypass the involuntariness doctrine,
256
 the decades since Miranda‘s 
issuance have produced numerous examples of state and federal 
police departments adapting to Miranda by employing a variety of 
ploys and devices that sidestep Miranda‘s protections.257  
 
 256. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1966) (explaining that the Court was 
supplementing the longstanding due process protections against involuntary statements with the 
now-familiar warnings and waiver rules because the police had developed new, sophisticated 
interrogation devices to extract statements that ―we might not find . . . to have been involuntary 
in traditional terms‖ but that nonetheless are not ―truly the product of free choice.‖). 
 257. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 633, 640–41 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of 
Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1009–10 (2001). For example, in 
a well-known ploy that eventually became the subject of a Supreme Court ruling in Missouri v. 
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), police officers regularly interrogated suspects with the following 
―two-stage interrogation,‖ id. at 617, procedure: first, the police would elicit a confession 
without Mirandizing the suspect, knowing full well that the statement would be unavailable for 
use in court because of the omission of Miranda warnings; then, after having obtained a 
confession, the police would administer Miranda warnings and question the suspect again, 
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Two juvenile confession decisions recently issued by New York 
State‘s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, provide vivid 
examples of the ease with which the police can work around 
constitutional regulations of the interrogation of juveniles. In one of 
these cases, the police used a variant on a ―two-stage interrogation 
procedure‖ condemned by the Supreme Court in 2004,258 obtaining 
an un-Mirandized statement from a fifteen-year-old youth at school, 
and then taking the youth to the precinct, placing him in an adult 
holding cell, and thereafter questioning him again after administering 
Miranda warnings.
259
 The lower courts upheld the confession on the 
ground that the taint of the earlier Miranda violation had been 
attenuated by the time of the re-initiated interrogation at the police 
station, and the Court of Appeals denied review.
260
 Yet, as two 
members of the Court of Appeals pointed out in dissenting from the 
denial of review, only an hour elapsed between the interrogations, 
and moreover a ―juvenile suspect is less likely [than an adult] to 
comprehend the meaning of Miranda warnings read shortly following 
a confession and understand that he can remain silent.‖261 In the other 
case, in which the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of 
suppression of a thirteen-year-old‘s confession, the police officer 
complied with all federal and state constitutional and state statutory 
preconditions for the interrogation of a juvenile: using a ―juvenile 
interview room‖; reading the Miranda warnings to the youth with a 
variant ―designed for use with juveniles . . . [that] explains each of 
 
invariably obtaining yet another confession (now ostensibly in compliance with Miranda, and 
available for use in court) because the suspect would feel that it was futile to assert his or her 
rights and remain silent after having already confessed, id. at 604–05, 609–11. The Supreme 
Court outlawed this particular practice in Seibert. See id. at 617. In a graphic demonstration of 
the persistence of even those police practices that have been expressly condemned by the 
courts, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently granted habeas corpus relief because the 
police obtained a confession by using one of the interrogation techniques disapproved of in the 
Miranda opinion itself. See Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421, 438–42, 448 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(granting writ of habeas corpus because one statement of accused was elicited by means of 
interrogation technique disapproved in Miranda opinion itself, ―in which the interrogator tries 
to dissuade a suspect from speaking with an attorney,‖ and two other statements were taken 
without prefatory Miranda warnings even though they were obtained by custodial 
interrogation). 
 258. See supra note 257 (discussing Missouri v. Seibert). 
 259. In re Daniel H., 938 N.E.2d 966, 967, 969 (N.Y. 2010). 
 260. See id. at 967–68. 
 261. See id. at 968–70 (Ciparick, J., dissenting, joined by Lippman, C.J.). 
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the rights in simple language‖; obtaining written waivers from the 
youth while his mother was present; advising the youth‘s mother of 
his Miranda rights (as the state statute requires); obtaining the 
mother‘s signature in addition to the youth‘s on a Miranda waiver 
card; and securing the mother‘s permission to speak with the youth 
alone.
262
 Once the child was alone, however, the officer induced the 
youth to confess by using the ploy of repeatedly offering to ―help‖ 
the child if he gave a written confession.
263
 In affirming the denial of 
suppression, the court‘s majority summarily rejected—as a ―novel 
theory‖—Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman‘s argument in his dissent 
that the police officer‘s misconduct vitiated the validity of the child‘s 
previously-given waivers.
264
 Whether one agrees with the majority or 
dissent, we imagine that all would agree that the cases demonstrate 
the ease with which police officers can work around Miranda and 
other protections in order to extract a confession from a child. 
The only way to ensure adequate enforcement of children‘s due 
process and Fifth Amendment rights during police interrogation is a 
remedy proposed a long time ago but never adopted: establish a 
bright-line rule that a child under the age of eighteen must be 
afforded an opportunity to confer with counsel before police 
interrogation. In 1977, in a comprehensive set of Juvenile Justice 
Standards drafted by a joint commission of the Institute of Judicial 
Administration (IJA) and the American Bar Association (ABA) and 
thereafter approved by the ABA House of Delegates,
265
 the IJA and 
 
 262. In re Jimmy D., 938 N.E.2d 970, 971–74 (N.Y. 2010); see also id. at 975–80 
(Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
 263. See id. at 971–72 (majority opinion); id. at 975–76 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
 264. See id. at 974–75 (majority opinion). In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Lippman 
used the social scientific literature on the characteristics of youth, see id. at 979 n.4 (Lippman, 
C.J., dissenting), as well as the relevant legal authorities, see id. at 979, to argue persuasively 
that, even if ―an experienced adult‖ may not have been ―misled by misrepresentations such as 
those made by the detective to Jimmy,‖ the ―facts before us simply do not permit‖ a finding of 
adequate waiver by ―a child, and to all appearances a very unsophisticated one with no prior 
involvement with the juvenile justice system, improperly deprived of parental support and 
guidance at a time when it would have been crucial to the protection of his interests.‖ Id. 
 265. For a description of the process by which the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards 
were developed, see ALAIRE BRETZ RIEFFEL, AM. BAR ASS‘N, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STANDARDS HANDBOOK 11–12 (1983). Rieffel was the Project Director of the ABA‘s Juvenile 
Justice Standards Implementation Project. 
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ABA recommended that the following safeguards be afforded in all 
police interrogations of juveniles: 
  ―Following an arrest, a juvenile may be questioned only 
after conferring with counsel. All such questioning must 
take place in counsel‘s presence unless the right to counsel 
has been previously waived.‖ 
  ―The right to counsel may only be waived after the juvenile 
has conferred with counsel and this waiver must take place 
in counsel‘s presence.‖266 
In making these recommendations, the Juvenile Justice Standards 
stated that the protections are needed because ―most ‗juveniles are 
not mature enough to understand their rights and are not competent to 
 
 266. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION—AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO POLICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS 69–70 (1980). In this 
same passage of the Standards, the IJA and ABA also recommended that, in all juvenile cases, 
the police must administer Miranda warnings not only to the juvenile but also to his or her 
parent or guardian. See id. at 69. Some States have adopted such a requirement by statute or 
state caselaw, and many state courts have ruled that parental presence is a significant factor in 
assessing the voluntariness of a statement and the voluntariness of a child‘s Miranda waiver. 
See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 518–22. We agree with these States that parental presence 
is a useful protection, but we believe that the only effective remedy is the other one 
recommended by the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project: access to counsel. In many 
cases, a parent or guardian is not much better able than the child to resist police pressure and to 
make an adequately knowing and voluntary assessment of the child‘s interests. Indeed, in 
arguing against the rule that was adopted in J.D.B., Justice Alito observed that ―many persons 
over the age of 18 are also more susceptible to police pressure than the hypothetical reasonable 
person.‖ J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2413 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
Although we certainly agree with the J.D.B. majority that this was not a reason for withholding 
a needed protection for children below the age of eighteen, it underscores the point that many 
parents and guardians will not be capable of playing the role of consultant and bulwark that the 
Juvenile Justice Standards Project envisioned. Moreover, at least some parents and guardians 
will make judgments based on their own relationships with the child and concern for the child‘s 
moral well-being. They may, for example, encourage a child to confess to a crime in order to 
take responsibility, whereas an adult criminal defendant who fully understands his or her rights 
would think in terms of the implications and consequences for the outcome of the pending 
criminal investigation. See GRISSO, supra note 127, at 183–85, 187, 199 (reporting results of 
empirical study of effects of parental presence during interrogation of child, which found that 
―parents generally cannot be relied on to provide juveniles with explanations of the rights and 
their significance‖ and that ―[m]ost parents gave no direct advice to their children regarding the 
waiver decision, and those that did offer advice almost always urged their children to waive 
rights‖); see also INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS‘N, supra, at 77 (―Counsel is 
preferable to a parent during any interrogation in many instances because a parent may either 
not know or not care about what is in a child‘s best interest.‖). 
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exercise them.‘‖267 In support of this proposition, the Standards 
quoted a 1969 law review article, which did not present empirical 
data for this proposition (since such data was not yet available) and 
instead relied partly on some anecdotal evidence and primarily on 
common sense.
268
 As we have already seen, the years since 1969 
have produced extensive empirical data to support the point.
269
 But it 
is also the case, as Justice Sotomayor‘s J.D.B. opinion explains, that 
―commonsense‖ can suffice to establish propositions about the nature 
of childhood that ―‗any parent knows‘‖ and for which ―citation to 
social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary.‖270 
The Juvenile Justice Standards acknowledged that ―[n]o court has 
yet fully adopted this approach,‖271 and that has continued to be the 
case in the ensuing years. But the Standards also note: 
 
 267. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS‘N, supra note 266, at 70 (quoting Elyce 
Zenoff Ferster & Thomas F. Courtless, Legislation: The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police 
Practices, and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REV. 567, 596–97 (1969)). 
 268. See Ferster & Courtless, supra note 267. 
 269. See supra notes 127–37, 176–79, 183–84, 196 and accompanying text. 
 270. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5. 
 271. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS‘N, supra note 266, at 72. The Standards 
explained that ―only one case could be found that required that a juvenile have the assistance of 
counsel before making a statement, [but that] other courts have noted the desirability of such a 
requirement.‖ Id. An accompanying footnote cites a single case: Ezell v. State, 489 P.2d 781 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971). INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS‘N, supra note 266, at 72 
n.112. In Ezell, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found a sixteen-year-old‘s confession 
to be inadmissible because ―[t]here was no evidence as to the ability of the minor to 
comprehend the effect of his [Miranda] waiver,‖ ―[n]or [was there] any evidence showing the 
ability of his mother or legal custodian [who were present during the interrogation] to properly 
advise him.‖ Id. at 783–84. The court explained that state law prohibits the admission of 
evidence of a minor‘s statement  
where there is absence of parent or guardian, or counsel, since such defendants should 
be deemed incapable of waiving the constitutional and statutory safeguards provided 
by law in a criminal case, unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor 
defendants fully understood the effect and the results growing out of such a waiver. 
Id. at 783 (quoting Story v. State, 452 P.2d 822, 825 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969)); see also Garner 
v. State, 500 P.2d 1340, 1341–42 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (distinguishing Ezell and upholding 
trial court‘s denial of suppression of seventeen-year-old‘s confession, notwithstanding absence 
of both parent and counsel during interrogation, because ―[d]efendant in the instant case, by his 
own testimony, acknowledged that he understood the consequences of the waiver of his 
Miranda rights‖). 
 The Standards also explained that ―[s]till other[] [cases] have required that a juvenile be 
given an opportunity to consult with a parent, counsel, or a mature advisor, following which a 
waiver may be obtained in that person‘s presence.‖ INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS‘N, 
supra note 266, at 72. The decision cited in support—Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 
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The recommendation derives some support from two early 
Supreme Court decisions. In Haley v. Ohio [in 1948], Justice 
Douglas‘ plurality opinion came close to suggesting that the 
factor of age alone may require the presence of an attorney 
before a confession could be held to be voluntary. Fourteen 
years later, Justice Douglas, writing this time for a majority of 
the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado [in 1962], used a totality of 
the circumstances approach but suggested that special tests be 
used for a juvenile because ―a 14 year old boy, no matter how 
sophisticated‖ cannot be expected to comprehend the 
significance of his actions.
272
 
As this passage recognizes, and as Part I‘s discussion of Haley and 
Gallegos showed in detail, the Court in these early cases 
demonstrated a keen understanding of a juvenile‘s need for the 
assistance of counsel in a stationhouse interrogation.
273
 As Part I also 
showed, this was true as well of the Court‘s 1967 opinion in In re 
Gault,
274
 in which the Court proclaimed that a juvenile charged with a 
crime ―‗requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
 
1972)—held that ―a juvenile‘s statement or confession cannot be used against him at a 
subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and his parents or guardian were informed of his 
rights to an attorney, and to remain silent,‖ and that ―[f]urthermore, the child must be given an 
opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian or an attorney representing the juvenile as to 
whether or not he wishes to waive those rights.‖ Id. at 142. This common law rule was 
subsequently superseded by the enactment of a statute. See Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 
1370 n.2 (Ind. 1988) (recognizing superseding). That statute, which is currently codified at IND. 
CODE § 31-32-5-1 (2010), provides that ―[a]ny rights guaranteed to a child . . . may be waived‖ 
by (1) counsel, or (2) ―the child‘s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem,‖ if 
―that person has no interest adverse to the child‖ and has ―meaningful[ly] consult[ed]‖ with the 
child, and ―the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver,‖ or (3) the child, even 
―without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem,‖ if ―the child has 
been emancipated‖ and ―knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver.‖ Id. Thus, except 
for children who have been emancipated, a child‘s waiver is not effective without an 
accompanying waiver from a custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem. In this 
regard, the statute expands the protections established in the 1972 decision. See Whipple, 523 
N.E.2d at 1370 n.2. However, as is apparent, the statute does not go as far as requiring that the 
child be afforded an opportunity to confer with counsel before being interrogated by the police. 
For further discussion of state law requirements that a child be permitted to consult with a 
parent or guardian before police interrogation, see HERTZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 518–22. 
 272. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS‘N, supra note 266, at 72 (footnotes omitted). 
 273. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text (discussing Haley), and supra notes 
49–53 and accompanying text (discussing Gallegos). 
 274. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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proceedings against him,‘‖ and recognized that the administration of 
the privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile cases should take 
into account whether there was ―participation of counsel.‖275 
Haley, Gallegos, and Gault reflect the Supreme Court‘s early 
recognition that the assistance of counsel is essential in juvenile cases 
in order to guard against what Gault termed the high risk that a 
juvenile‘s confession is ―the product of . . . adolescent fantasy, fright 
or despair‖ or ―the product of ignorance of rights.‖276 Everything that 
we have learned about juveniles since—the social scientific data cited 
in the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Graham 
v. Florida
277
 and the statistics that J.D.B. referenced regarding the 
high incidence of false confessions by juveniles
278—confirms and 
underscores these early cases‘ ―commonsense‖ understanding.  
 In our view, the time has come to implement the vision of the 
Juvenile Justice Standards and to establish a bright-line rule that a 
juvenile‘s waiver of Miranda rights will be deemed ineffective unless 
the youth was first given the opportunity to confer with counsel.
279
 
We appreciate how difficult it will be to implement a rule of this sort. 
In many parts of the United States, juveniles even today do not 
receive the full benefit of the constitutional right to counsel 
established by In re Gault in 1967.
280
 A bold call for lawyers to be 
 
 275. Id. at 36, 55. For discussion of Gault, see supra notes 83–97 and accompanying text. 
 276. Id. at 55. 
 277. See supra notes 176–79, 183–84 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 279. Precisely because this is a bright-line rule, it avoids a criticism that Justice Alito‘s 
dissenting opinion in J.D.B. leveled at the rule adopted by the majority. Justice Alito asserted 
that ―[t]he Court‘s decision greatly diminishes the clarity and administrability that have long 
been recognized as ‗principal advantages‘ of Miranda‘s prophylactic requirements,‖ J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting), by requiring that ―judges attempt to 
put themselves in the shoes of the average 16-year-old, or 15-year-old, or 13-year-old, as the 
case may be‖ to determine, for example, ―whether the differences between a typical 16 1/2-
year-old and a typical 18-year-old with respect to susceptibility to the pressures of interrogation 
are sufficient to change the outcome of the custody determination,‖ id. at 2416. The rule we 
propose eliminates the need for such individualized assessments and provides the police and the 
reviewing courts with a clear, straightforward mandate of what procedures must be followed in 
any case involving a suspect below the age of eighteen. 
 280. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., AM. BAR ASS‘N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., JUVENILE 
LAW CTR., & YOUTH LAW CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO 
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2002); 
Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to Pay 
the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 543 (2009). 
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available to appear with their juvenile clients at police precincts 
imagines a world quite different from ours. But it is a world that, in 
our view, is absolutely necessary in order to safeguard the important 
rights at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have focused exclusively on J.D.B.‘s 
implications for confession suppression law. In closing, it is worth 
noting that J.D.B. certainly has important implications for many other 
aspects of juvenile rights in criminal and delinquency proceedings. 
Most obviously and directly, the Court‘s reconfiguration of the 
Miranda ―custody‖ requirement to incorporate the age of a minor 
suspect calls for an equivalent reshaping of the Fourth Amendment 
standards for a Terry stop and an arrest.
281
 Equally relevant are other 
aspects of Fourth Amendment law for which a suspect‘s age can 
affect the constitutional analysis, such as the rules for determining the 
validity of an individual‘s consent to a search.282 Less obvious and 
with even more profound ramifications, J.D.B.‘s analysis of the 
inherent qualities of youth, and its treatment of this subject matter as 
self-evident ―commonsense propositions,‖ strongly reinforces 
commentators‘ calls for reconsidering whether juveniles can be held 
to adult criminal standards of mens rea, criminal culpability, and 
competence to stand trial
283—and for reassessing standards for 
transfer of youth to criminal court.
284
 All of these developments in the 
law were foreseeable when the Court issued Roper v. Simmons in 
2005 and Graham v. Florida in 2010, but the Eighth Amendment 
 
 281. For discussion of the current state of the law on these issues, see Hertz ET AL., supra 
note 61, at 405–17. 
 282. For current standards on this issue, see id. at 442–45. 
 283. See, e.g., Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study 
of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 27 (2000); Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 
7 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 16 (1999); Thomas Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making: A 
Developmental Perspective on Constitutional Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2006); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental 
Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005); Kim 
Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 143 
(2003). 
 284. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer 
Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010). 
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context of those cases may have been regarded by some courts as 
standing in the way of a broader application of their analyses of the 
nature of youth and its legal relevance. By extending the reasoning of 
those decisions to a bedrock rule of criminal procedure, J.D.B. has 
opened the door to an extensive reshaping of juvenile rights in 
criminal and delinquency cases. 
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